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Since the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill, the U.S. market prices of soybeans and 
corn have dropped 21% and 32%, respectively. These commodities are sold on the 
market at a price below what they cost to produce. If U.S. agricultural policies contribute 
to this trend, then they do so to the benefit of commodity purchasers, particularly the 
industrial operations that use the commodities as raw material inputs. Corporate-owned 
livestock operations are a case in point. This paper focuses on the broiler chicken 
industry, which, in the United States, is fully industrialized and vertically integrated. We 
compare the average costs of production for broiler feed components—corn and soybean 
meal—with market prices, and then use these cost-price margins to estimate the amount 
broiler companies save by being able to purchase feed at a price below production costs. 
We find that the broiler industry gained monetary benefits averaging $1.25 billion per 
year between 1997 and 2005 when, following the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill, market 
prices dropped far below production costs. In contrast, broiler industry gains from low 
market prices averaged a much smaller $377 million per year between 1986 and 1996. 
We conclude that the corporate broiler industry is a major winner from changes to U.S. 
agriculture policy that have allowed feed prices to fall. This finding is not significantly 
altered when we adjust our calculations to account for the overvaluation of agricultural 
land, nor does it appear to reverse under future cost/price scenarios. As policymakers turn 
their attention to the 2007 Farm Bill, they would do well to examine the ways in which 
agribusiness firms in general, and industrial livestock operations in particular, benefit 
from policies ostensibly designed to support family farmers. Current U.S. farm policies 
may be driving industrialization in the livestock production system if they give factory 
operations the appearance of being more cost efficient than diversified, independent 
operations that grow their own feed.   
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  The passage of the 1996 Farm Bill marked one of the most significant shifts in 
U.S. agricultural policy since the 1930s. In the ten years since its passage, researchers 
have examined the impacts of these reforms on agricultural producers and markets both 
at home and abroad (see, for example: Waller 1996; Smith 1997; Knutson 1998; Scott 
1999; Anderson 2001; Ray 2001; Orden 2002; Zulauf 2003). Among the trends revealed 
in domestic research are lower commodity prices and stagnant or declining net farm 
income for U.S. farmers (Ray 2003; Wise 2005, based on USDA/ERS data).  
 
Many of the most vocal critics of U.S. farm policy, including some major players 
in World Trade Organization agriculture negotiations, many U.S. government officials, 
and some prominent development groups, point to U.S. farm subsidies as the culprit 
behind overproduction and declining commodity prices (Oxfam 2003; Beattie 2005; 
Council of Economic Advisors 2006). Meanwhile, U.S. agribusiness groups and some 
domestic farm advocates counter that subsidies are a necessary expense if the U.S. 
government hopes to maintain a vibrant farm sector (American Farm Bureau Federation 
2006).  
 
The debate over subsidies has moved the focus off some of the most dramatic and 
important farm policy changes codified in the 1996 Farm Bill—among them, the 
elimination of remaining supply control programs—and the impact of these changes on 
the agricultural supply chain. The development of sound proposals for farm policy reform 
hinges on an understanding of how U.S. agricultural policy relates to and affects the 
structure of the food system, and on recognizing which parties win and which lose in the 
current policy environment.  
 
Intuitively, most readers probably recognize that when the prices of commodities 
such as corn and soybeans decline, purchasers of these commodities will benefit. But 
who are these purchasers, and to what extent have they benefited from policy changes 
that have affected commodity prices? We approach these questions in the following way. 
First, we examine the extent to which the market prices of corn and soybeans have been 
below average production costs, and whether that cost-price margin grew following the 
policy changes associated with the 1996 Farm Bill.  Large cost-price margins would 
signify a failure of the market to compensate family farmers for producing these crops, 
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which could be detrimental to the wellbeing and livelihoods of farm households.  Second, 
we posit that if prices for corn and soybeans, key ingredients in industrial livestock feed, 
fell further below costs after the 1996 Farm Bill was enacted, industrial broiler chicken 
companies have likely benefited.  These companies purchase feed from the market, and 
feed costs constitute 60% of production costs. Our research focuses specifically on the 
broiler chicken industry because its high level of concentration and vertical integration 
allows production cost estimates to be generalized with relative ease. We attempt to 
quantify the monetary value of the industry’s gains from farm policies that allow feed 
prices to decline below production costs, compared to a policy scenario in which market 
prices accurately reflect the cost of production. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  In section 1, we review relevant 
literature on the link between feed prices and the economic wellbeing of the corporate 
livestock industry, and examine other literature that has attempted to compare the market 
price of agricultural commodities to the crops’ costs of production.  Surprisingly little 
research has been done on this subject.  Section 2 provides an overview of U.S. 
agricultural policies, particularly for corn and soybeans, and examines the extent to which 
the 1996 policy reforms lowered market prices below what they were before supply 
management policies were fully dismantled. We find market prices for corn and soybeans 
significantly lower than they were before the reforms, and much further below production 
costs. Section 3 discusses the evolution of the U.S. broiler industry, the most 
concentrated segment of the nation’s livestock sector and the most important source of 
animal protein in the U.S. diet. 
 
In sections 4 and 5, we present our methodology, data, and findings. We use a 
methodology that compares average costs of production with market prices for corn and 
soybeans, and then uses these cost-price margins to estimate the amount that broiler 
producers save when they are able to purchase feed at a price below the cost of 
production. We refer to these savings as an “implicit subsidy”—not a direct subsidy to 
the industry from the government, but a reduction in the industry’s costs resulting from 
the structure of U.S. farm policy.  Stated differently, the implicit subsidy measures how 
much industrial broiler companies gain from purchasing feed under current policy 
conditions, compared with what they would pay for feed if federal farm policies were 
structured to ensure that feed prices reflected the cost of producing the feed components.  
 
We find that between 1997 and 2005, corn was sold on the market at an average 
of 23% below what it cost to produce, and soybeans were sold at 15% below production 
cost. These cost-price margins are significantly larger in the post-Farm Bill period than 
they were in the eleven years prior, when the margins averaged 17% for corn and 5% for 
soybeans. These margins translate into monetary gains for corporate broiler facilities, 
which, since the passage of the Farm Bill, have been able to purchase feed at a price 21% 
lower than the production cost of the feed components. That gap would be even higher if 
market prices accurately reflected the cost of producing feed plus a reasonable profit for 
those involved in the production process—namely, farmers. In dollar terms, we estimate 
that between 1997 and 2005, the broiler industry gained an average of $1.25 billion per 
year in “implicit subsidies”—cost savings resulting from U.S. agricultural policies that let 




corn and soybean market prices, and feed prices in turn, fall below production costs. This 
implicit subsidy was over $850 million per year above the average implicit subsidy in the 
pre-Farm Bill period. Because feed is the largest single variable expense in broiler 
production, the implicit subsidy reduces overall broiler operating costs by 13%, 
compared to a scenario where feed was priced at cost of production.  
 
In section 6, we discuss the implications of our findings, particularly for other 
industrial livestock sub-sectors such as hogs, in which some diversified family farmers 
are still trying to compete with factory farms. Our initial calculation suggests similar cost 
reductions for corporate hog farms from U.S. agricultural policy, which provides them 
with an important boost to their competitive advantage over family farmers who do not 
purchase the majority of their animal feed from the market. In this section, we also 
address the inflation of land value estimates in the USDA data and examine future cost-
price scenarios for corn and soybeans in light of expanding demand for corn-based 
ethanol.   
 
We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications for U.S. agricultural 
policies and the needs for future research. As policymakers turn their attention to the 
2007 Farm Bill, it is important to examine the ways in which agribusiness firms in 
general, and industrial livestock operations in particular, benefit from policies ostensibly 
designed to support family farmers.  As this study suggests, most diversified family 
farmers would be better served by policies that ensure market prices in excess of 
production costs.  To the extent such policies reduce the current cost advantages enjoyed 
by industrial animal factories, they will further the stated goals of U.S. agricultural 
policy, and will perhaps help reverse the trend toward concentrated industrial hog and 
beef cattle production. 
 
 
I: Research Rationale 
 
At the time the 1996 Farm Bill was passed, it was arguably the biggest change to 
U.S. farm law in sixty years.  Prior to the 1996 Farm Act, federal farm policy employed 
schemes like grain reserves and set-asides, which increased prices by controlling supply. 
These tools were stripped away in 1996; within four years, production of corn, soybeans, 
and other commodities had risen sharply, while market prices and net farm income had 
stagnated or declined. Through a series of emergency payments that were made 
permanent in the 2002 Farm Bill, Congress wrote into law a system in which farm 
income was supported by government payments, instead of by higher market prices for 
farm products. Under the new system, market prices fell below the cost of production, 
and government spending on farm subsidies went through the roof. In 2000 alone, 
government aid made up 100% of net farm income in eight states (Keeney 2003).  
Despite record subsidy levels, however, net farm income failed to rise.  
 
On its face, this system may appear to make little sense: why would the 
government replace price stabilizing policy with a policy based on low market prices and 
massive taxpayer subsidies to farmers? Adding to the confusion is the irony of what 




happened to agricultural markets after the signing of the 1996 Farm Bill.  Although 
market prices for crops like corn and soybeans fell, farmers’ production of these crops 
increased.  The political and economic reasoning behind these paradoxes will be 
addressed in Section 2. For now, we will simply note three major trends that 
characterized the post-1996 Farm Bill period: rising production of commodities like corn 
and soybeans; falling market prices for these crops; and government subsidy levels that 
grew in response, as they attempted to make up for unprofitable market prices and 
provide a reasonable income to America’s farmers.  
  
It wasn’t just U.S. farmers who saw market returns for their products fall in the 
aftermath of the 1996 Farm Bill. Falling prices in the United States led to falling prices 
around the world (Watkins 2002). The Minneapolis-based Institute for Agriculture and 
Trade Policy (IATP) and the development agency Oxfam International took the lead 
among development and farm policy advocacy groups in examining the impacts of low 
commodity prices on international markets, though many other analysts have weighed in 
on the subject (Watkins 2002; Berthelot 2003; Oxfam 2003; Ray 2003; Ritchie 2003). 
Both IATP and Oxfam supported their theories by calculating “dumping margins” for 
U.S. farm crops, defined as the difference between production costs and the market prices 
of exported U.S. commodities. The IATP method combines USDA estimates of the 
farmer cost of production, government input subsidy estimates from the OECD, and an 
added cost for transportation and handling to find a “true” cost of production for farm 
products.  A product is dumped if it is exported at a price less than what it cost to 
produce.  Work by Oxfam, IATP, and IFPRI has examined the impact of dumping on 
developing country producers, and has concluded that the impact has often been quite 
negative (Watkins 2002; Oxfam 2003; Ritchie 2003).  In brief, this research suggests that 
U.S. agricultural policy provokes depressed prices for basic commodities, leading to 
reduced net farm income for many U.S. producers while at the same time undercutting 
developing country markets when those commodities are exported at a price that does not 
accurately reflect production costs. 
  
Curiously, despite an extensive review of agricultural economics literature dating 
back to 1960, we were unable to find much literature that asked a logical follow-up 
question: If many U.S. and developing country producers are hurt by depressed 
commodity prices, and if U.S. agricultural policies have played a role in encouraging this 
price trend, then who benefits from such policies?  Our literature review revealed only a 
small group of analysts who address this question. Of those who do, several explicitly 
name the industrial livestock sector, input providers such as Monsanto, and agribusiness 
purchasers and traders as major beneficiaries from low commodity prices (see Ray 
(2003), Berthelot (2004) and Wise (2005)).  Several other analysts have called the 
public’s attention to the general benefit that industrial livestock producers enjoy when the 
price of feed inputs such as corn and soybeans falls (Skaggs 1997; Skaggs and Falk 1998; 
Ishmael 1999; Rae 2000; Farm Foundation 2006).  Others discuss the role of low feed 
prices in the structural transformation of the livestock industry. Caron (1987) and 
Holtslander (2002) credit cheap feed with a role in the growth and industrialization of the 
livestock production system in Canada, while Halverson (2000) does so for the United 
States. A 2005 report by the USDA/ERS names cheap feed in the United States as one 




factor driving the integration and industrialization of U.S. and Canadian hog production 
systems. Hogs are increasingly bred and raised to feeder pigs in Canada, and then shipped 
to the United States for fattening in confined operations because of relatively cheaper 
feed prices (Haley 2005). 
 
A review of statements by representatives from the livestock sector suggests that 
the industry recognizes the importance of low-cost feed to its economic viability, and 
supports policies that keep the prices of corn and soybeans low.  In a hearing before the 
House Agriculture Committee in 2001, representatives of the National Pork Producers 
Council, Perdue Farms, the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, and the American 
Sheep Industry Association laid out their positions on the content of the upcoming 2002 
Farm Bill.  The representatives advocated for the continuation of market-based pricing 
for feed grains and oilseeds, and of subsidy programs that fill the gap between lower 
market prices and a higher target price (Congressional Press Release 2001; Tarter 2001).  
The pork industry representative suggested that, if politically necessary, Congress should 
pass additional income support programs for farm households to keep them solvent 
despite low prices (Determan 2001). Among the specific policies supported by industry 
representatives were a reduction in the federal soybean loan rate (the price paid to 
soybean producers) and the continuation of planting flexibility. Representatives criticized 
government programs that could raise the price of feed grains, including mandatory set-
asides, production controls, or a farmer-owned food security reserve (Congressional Press 
Release 2001).   
 
Our literature review revealed a general understanding by industry, academic, and 
NGO sources of the benefits to industrial livestock operations from low-cost feed. 
However, we discovered a dearth of economic research that calculated the monetary 
gains to the livestock sector from policies that drive feed prices below production costs.  
The lack of empirical research exclusively devoted to this question limits the public’s 
ability to understand the full economic and structural impacts of U.S. farm policy.  
 
 
II: General Policy Background 
 
Over the last twenty years, U.S. agriculture policy has become increasingly 
market-oriented.  Major policy changes took place during the 1996 Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, when supply management tools that had been 
used since the 1930s to control market prices and ensure a fair return for farmers were 
dismantled.  Advocates of this shift argued that supply management and price 
stabilization strategies resulted in economic inefficiencies and distorted markets, 
preventing farmers from responding to price signals.  
 
Meanwhile, opponents of the shift underscored the unique nature of agricultural 
markets and production patterns. Drawing on economics literature dating back to the first 
half of the 19
th century (see, for example, Peek 1922; Warren 1924), some in the 
agriculture policy community asserted that a deregulation of agricultural markets would 
result in unmitigated overproduction and falling prices.  Unlike other industries, they 




claimed, agricultural producers do not tend to respond to price signals by reducing supply 
when prices decline.  Agriculture is unique in several respects: it requires large capital 
investments with a slow rate of return, which puts pressure on producers to continue 
producing even when prices fall; and, as a “living” industry, agriculture cannot simply be 
turned on and off depending on market signals. The market is made up of a large number 
of small producers, each of whom is unable to individually influence price through his or 
her output decisions. Individual farmers may respond to declining prices by reducing 
hired labor, but they generally do not reduce production; instead, they continue to 
produce as much as possible so as to spread fixed costs across the maximum amount of 
output (Warren 1924).  When prices drop so low that farmers are unable to remain in 
business, they generally sell their farms to another producer, leading to increasing 
concentration and continued overproduction (Wise 2004). The policy prescription was 
clear: the sector as a whole would be unable to reduce supply and ensure fair prices 
without government intervention (Harl 2003; Ray 2003; Wise 2004).  
 
The argument against the removal of supply control mechanisms has gained 
traction since passage of the 1996 Farm Bill. Soybean market prices dropped 21% 
between 1996 and 2005, while corn market prices dropped 32%.  At the same time, corn 
production increased 28%, and soybean production rose by 42%.  Input costs rose; the 
farmer cost of production per acre between 1996 and 2005 increased by 14% for corn and 
by 12% for soybeans (USDA/ERS 1986-2005; USDA/ERS 2005). The squeeze of rising 
production costs and falling prices resulted in an inflation-adjusted average decline in net 
farm income of 15.5% between 1996 and 2003 (Ray 2003).  
 
  Figure 1: Real Farm Income 
  




































Source:  ERS/USDA, Farm Income and Balance Sheet Indicators, 1929-2004, accessed Dec. 3, 2004
 
 




Despite the failure of the 1996 legislation to live up to its goals of stabilizing 
agricultural supply and demand, supply control measures were not reinstated in the Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002.  Instead, Congress passed a bill that mirrored 
and in some ways expanded the 1996 policies, ensuring that taxpayers would continue to 
shoulder the difference between the low market prices for agricultural goods and higher 
target prices set by Congress.   
 
Since its inception in the 1930s, modern U.S. farm policy has tried to buffer 
farmers from some of the vulnerabilities inherent in agricultural markets, and to ensure 
them a steady income.  In the last ten years, however, net farm income has declined or 
remained stagnant, while farmers’ input costs have grown (Ray 2003; Wise 2005). 
Ironically, the squeeze on farm households has been accompanied by skyrocketing rates 
of government payments to farmers.  
 
 
The Farm Policy Paradox 
 
  How did we get to the farm policy paradox we have today?  If farmers’ incomes 
are not rising under the current system, then who benefits from agriculture policies that 
allow the market price for commodities to fall?  Below, we provide a brief overview of 
some of the important changes in U.S. commodity policy in recent years in order to lay 
the groundwork for interpreting the research findings that follow.  
 
While the specific details of U.S. agricultural commodity policy have changed 
over the last seventy-three years, their apparent core purpose has been to support farmers’ 
income in a market that is often volatile and tends toward overproduction.  To do this, 
commodity policies have been designed to either control supply (including by taking land 
out of production or creating reserves), establish a target price, or pay the difference 
between the target price and the market price.  Commodity programs have not been 
aimed at all producers and agricultural goods, but rather, at specific non-perishable crops. 
The list of commodities has generally included corn, soybeans, cotton, rice, wheat, sugar, 
barley, oats, and sorghum (Marlow 2005).  
 
Starting with the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933, and 
continuing over the next thirty years, acreage reduction and set-aside programs were 
central to U.S. farm policy.  The tools were utilized as a way to influence prices 
indirectly by restricting the use of land for agricultural production, and thereby 
constraining the supply of agricultural commodities (Westcott 1999).  Beginning with the 
1965 Food and Agricultural Act, however, farm legislation began to move away from 
controlling supply, instead paying the difference between target and market prices 
(Marlow 2005).  Slowly but surely, government control over supply and demand was 
rejected in favor of a market-oriented approach that, it was claimed, would allow U.S. 
farmers to take advantage of rising demand in the global marketplace (Dimitri 2005). The 
result has been a major adjustment of the farm income support burden. Income that had 




once been supported by higher prices paid by the purchasers, processors, and consumers 
of U.S. farm products increasingly came to be supported by government payments. 
 
Important shifts towards deregulation occurred with the 1985 Food Security Act 
and 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act.  In particular, the repayment 
rate for the Marketing Loan Assistance program, which up until 1985 served as a floor 
price for program crops, was allowed to decline when the world market price fell below 
the previously announced loan rate.  The 1990 Farm Bill established Loan Deficiency 
Payments (LDPs), which would pay the farmer the difference between the loan rate and 
the MLA repayment rate.  The 1990 Farm Act also initiated greater planting flexibility by 
allowing up to 15% of crop base acres to be planted to any crop without affecting crop 
bases or deficiency payments (Ash 2006) .  With a de facto floor price no longer in place, 
Congress effectively gave up the tool it had traditionally employed to enforce a fair price 
in the marketplace (Marlow 2005).  
 
The 1996 FAIR Act marked the most significant shift away from previous 
commodity policies since the 1930s.  At the time it was authorized, the market prices for 
most commodities were on an upswing due to increased domestic and export demand.  
Economic forecasters’ optimism was buoyed by studies such as a 1994 report sponsored 
by the National Grain and Feed Association, Large-Scale Land Idling Has Retarded 
Growth in U.S. Agriculture, which predicted that export demand would continue to grow 
and asserted that if the U.S. crop area was not liberated from set-aside programs and put 
back into production, the agriculture sector would find itself left behind in the global 
marketplace (Abel 1994).  Guided in part by such thinking, supply controls were further 
dismantled in 1996 (Ash 2006). At the same time, a new form of government support 
payments to farmers, Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments, were put in place 
of previous income support programs.  These payments were “decoupled” – not directly 
tied to farmers’ current production decisions, but based on their planting history – and 
meant to decrease over time so that farmers would be weaned off government support 
(Dimitri 2005). Eventually, farmers were expected to alter their planting decisions in 
response to price signals in the marketplace, acting their part as rational players in the 
global economy (Marlow 2005).  
 
The prophecies proved to be wrong, however, at least in the short term.  In mid-
1997, the Asian financial crisis hit, reducing global demand for U.S. goods; by 1998, 
market prices for crops had dropped due to high domestic and world production and a 
precipitous decline in export demand.  The U.S. Congress hurried to bail out farmers by 
authorizing massive emergency payments, called Market Loss Assistance (MLA) 
payments.  These continued through 2002, when the Farm Security and Rural Investment 
Act—a bill containing the largest commodity title in history—was authorized and passed 
by Congress. The 2002 Farm Act not only continued authorizing the marketing assistance 
loans, but it also institutionalized the MLA payments; these became Counter-Cyclical 
Payments (CCPs), called such because they rose when prices dropped and vice versa.  
The PFC payments that had been envisioned as “transitional” in 1996 were also 
continued in the form of Direct Payments (DPs)  (Westcott 2002).  According to the 
policies’ supporters, DPs are decoupled and CCPs partially decoupled from production, 




and are calculated using a farmer’s historical base (Marlow 2005).  The 2002 Farm Act 
provided some additional support to farmers through increased safety net payments, but 
the tools of price stabilization and supply control remained off the table.   
 
Building on policies crafted during the 1980s and 90s, the 2002 Farm Act guided 
the United States to its current paradoxical state. U.S. farm policy maintains the 
semblance of free-market orientation by ostensibly keeping most payments decoupled 
from production, and by allowing farmers greater planting flexibility.  At the same time, 
however, it maintains high taxpayer transfers to farmers. Market prices have dropped 
below production costs; government payments prop up land values and rental rates (Harl 
2003).  An additional paradox is that of the political lobbies that, in an environment of 
policy failure, oppose any major changes to existing farm legislation (American Farm 
Bureau Federation 2006). By examining the evolution in farm policy with respect to two 
program crops, corn and soybeans, and by following the policies’ impact on market 
prices and farmers’ net returns, we can see that the real winners are not those who 




A Closer Look at the Impact of Farm Policy: Soybeans and Corn 
 
Over the past ten years, both soybean and corn yields and planted acreages in the 
United States have climbed steadily to record levels (Ash 2006). New varieties of seeds 
and improved applications of fertilizers and pesticides have had a positive effect on 
yields.  Meanwhile, an increase in planted acreage can be attributed to various changes in 
farm legislation.  Starting in the 1990 Farm Act, soybean producers became eligible for 
marketing assistance loans; in the 2002 Farm Act, farmers were allowed to establish 
soybean base acres for the first time and could therefore receive direct and counter-
cyclical payments (Ash 2006).  Planting flexibility policies, which were first initiated in 
1990 and then expanded in the 1996 FAIR Act with the removal of most restrictions on 
planted acreage, also had a significant impact on production.  All of these factors have 
led to an increase in cross-price elasticity: when prices for soybeans or corn increase, 
farmers are more likely to shift production from other crops into soybeans, corn, or to 
adopt half-corn, half-soybean rotations (Ash 2006).   
 
The assertion that farm legislation, particularly the 1996 FAIR Act, had an impact 
on soybean production levels is consistent with a 2000 study conducted by the USDA 
Economic Research Service in conjunction with the University of Tennessee’s 
Agricultural Policy Analysis Center.  The study used economic modeling to estimate the 
effects of 1996 farm legislation, and projected that the policy change would have the 
biggest impact on soybeans, causing an increase of over 2 million planted acres by 2005. 
It projected that under the 1996 policy, soybean market prices would be roughly 5-6% 
($0.35/bu) lower between 2000-2005 than under a scenario based on the previous policy 
regime. The study also projected that corn acreage would decrease between 1996 and 
2005 because farmers would convert more corn to soybeans or other competing crops.  




As a result of projected lower planted acreage, the study predicted higher returns per 
bushel for corn farmers (Lin 2000).  
 
The findings on soybeans were more than borne out by 2005—acreage in fact 
increased by 11 million acres (see Figure 2) (USDA/ERS 1986-2005; USDA 2006). 
However, the corn projections were less accurate. The study did not foresee a massive 
increase in demand for corn for ethanol processing or a precipitous drop in soybean 
market prices; corn acreage actually increased overall between 1996 and 2005. The 
demand for corn still failed to keep up with supply, however.  While the average market 
price received by corn growers between 1987 and 1998 was above the loan rate, between 
1999 and 2001 the national corn price received by farmers was generally below the $1.89 
per-bushel loan rate, and government payments have constituted most of the returns to 
farmers (see Figure 3) (Chambers 2004).  
 
 
  Figure 2: Soybean Acreage and Price 





























  Figure 3: Corn Acreage and Price 

























Moreover, although planting flexibility allowed for the rapid expansion of 
soybean acreage, the contraction in acreage has been less forthcoming.  For example, in 
2001 when soybean market prices dropped to levels not seen since 1972, U.S. farmers 
planted a record 75.4 million acres (Ash 2001). While troubling for soybean producers, 
the subsequent low prices have been a boon for the industrial livestock industry and other 
bulk purchasers of U.S. farm products, which have been able to greatly expand 
production (Ash 1998).    
 
 
III: Structural Changes in the Broiler Industry  
 
The present-day broiler chicken industry is worlds away from the industry that 
existed in the first half of the 20
th century, due largely to processes of consolidation, 
integration, and industrialization that have taken place over the last sixty years. These 
processes have shaped the industry into a concentrated production system controlled by a 
small number of large agribusiness firms; these firms oversee all links in the production 
chain, including breeding and the hatching of chicks, the milling of feed grain, the grow-
out stage, and the processing and packaging of finished birds.  Helped along by changing 
consumer preferences, massive production increases, and falling costs, the broiler 
industry now contributes the largest share of animal protein in the American diet (Steedle 
1986; USDA/NASS 2002). 
 
The history of the broiler industry in the United States is one of consolidation – 
massive growth in production capacity, and massive decline in the number of farmers 




involved in the industry. Through the early part of the 20
th century, most chickens were 
raised on small farms or in backyard flocks, and their meat was largely a by-product of 
egg production. Independent feed mills, breeders, hatcheries, producers, and processors 
traded with each other in a system of often unstable spot markets. Beginning in the 
1940s, however, feed stores began selling chicks, feed, medicine and equipment to 
growers, and then buying the grown chickens back for processing and sale. This system, 
pioneered by Georgia feed store owner Jesse Jewell, marked the beginning of a process 
of consolidation and control of the production chain by one central party (first the feed 
store owners, and later packers and agribusiness firms, broadly referred to as 
“integrators”).   
 
The independent businesses that once made up the poultry production process 
were integrated through a system of contracts or outright ownership of production stages 
by the integrators, who reduced costs by coordinating production at each stage to avoid 
overproduction and shortages, and by utilizing economies of size to purchase feed, 
medicine, and equipment at a bulk discount.  Although many broilers continue to be 
hatched and raised by growers who contract independently with integrators, the 
integrators retain ownership of the birds during the entire life cycle, from breeding to 
slaughter and sale.  Processing facilities and feed mills are part of the integrated 
company, and the finished broilers are sold by marketers at the integrated firm (Knoeber 
1989; Aho 1999; Goodwin 2005). 
 
The process of consolidation is nowhere better illustrated than by time series data 
on the number of broiler production facilities in the United States. In the 1930s, the 
hatching of broiler chicks was spread among some 11,000 independent facilities with an 
average capacity of 24,000 eggs. By 2001, the number of hatcheries had declined by 97% 
—to only 323—but with an average incubator capacity of 2.7 million eggs.  Over 170 
million broiler chicks are now turned over to grow-out facilities each week in the United 
States.  Broilers have increased in size along with the industry; the average live weight of 
a broiler went from 3.03 pounds in 1945 to 5.06 pounds in 2001 (USDA/ERS 1997; 




Why did integration happen? 
 
A number of analysts have explored the factors that lead to the consolidation and 
integration of the broiler industry (Henry 1960; Steedle 1986; Aho 1999; Paul 1999; 
MacDonald 2004). Key to their theories is the nature of spot markets in broiler 
production: these markets were historically quite thin, meaning that they were highly 
sensitive to local variations in volume. In the absence of integration, over- and under-
production in one link along the chain affected the economic outcome for every other 
firm along the chain, as well as for competitor firms.  During seasons of low demand, the 
broiler industry had to reduce volume at all points along the chain; if this process was not 
done in a coordinated fashion, the result was localized volume and price instability 




(Henry 1960; Steedle 1986; Aho 1999).  Integration was one way of dealing with 
unstable spot markets and volume control problems. Because the integrator controlled the 
entire process, production decisions could be made and coordinated by a central 
authority. Growers supported the idea of integration because it reduced the risk they 
faced in spot markets by providing contracts that guaranteed a set price for their product 
(Aho 1999; Paul 1999). Integration also reduced the transaction costs faced by different 
firms in the production chain. Economists tend to take either a risk-sharing or a 
transaction cost approach to integration analysis, but some analysts acknowledge that 
both factors provided an incentive for the transformation of the industry (MacDonald 
2004).   
 
Integration also helped to address issues of quality control and price 
differentiation for broilers.  Since the quality of a bird is generally not discernable until 
processing, the only spot market in which quality and price differentials could exist was 
that between processors and retailers.  Some economists argue that the lack of 
differentials at earlier points in the process led to inefficiency in the industry, and that 
integrators reduced that inefficiency by exercising direct control over all stages of 
production, resulting in greater quality consistency (Henry 1960; Bugos 1992; Paul 1999; 
MacDonald 2004). Integration also allowed firms to complete the entire production 
process in a localized area, an extremely important cost-reducing factor given the high 
rate of bird death and weight loss during transport.  Contracting with hatcheries, grow-out 
facilities, and processing plants in the same area—what McDonald  refers to as “site 
specificity”—helped to minimize the loss in value that broilers experience during 
transport, as well as to reduce transport and feed costs for integrators (MacDonald 2004).  
 
Finally, some analysts highlight the role that integration has played in the 
diffusion of new technology along the broiler production chain (Knoeber 1989; Bugos 
1992; Knoeber 1995; Paul 1999; MacDonald 2004).  Off-farm firms with access to 
significant capital can tap into new technology and credit opportunities more easily than 
individual growers, and are willing to make investments in genetic research, feed 
development, and other production technology.  Contracts shift the risks of developing 
and introducing these new technologies from producers to integrators, while contracts 
that base compensation rates on grower productivity and performance have helped 
encourage technology adoption. Analysts credit this system for increased efficiency in the 
broiler industry; the performance of growers is largely determined by the efficiency with 
which feed is converted to meat, the growers’ success in reducing mortality, and their 
attention to quality control, all factors that can be influenced by the use of new 
technologies.  Under the current contractual regime, grower performance determines pay-
out rates by the integrator, giving growers an incentive to adapt to new technologies in 
order to ensure the greatest long-run returns  (for more information on performance 
contracts, see Knoeber 1989). 
 
As a result, feed efficiency doubled between 1945 and 1970, and labor 
productivity rose an annual average of 10.5% per year over the same period (MacDonald 
2004). Production costs for broilers dropped by nearly 90% between 1947 and 1999 (Aho 




1999).  These dramatic efficiency gains helped propel the broiler industry to the position 
of prominence it holds today among animal protein suppliers to U.S. consumers.   
 
In pursuit of these efficiencies and the profits that accompanied them, 
agribusiness firms engaged in a frenzy of integration and consolidation in a small number 
of broiler-producing states beginning in the late 1940s.  Presently, the top 15 broiler-
producing states account for 94.4% of all production, and the top 8 states-- Arkansas, 
Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina, Texas, Louisiana, Missouri, and Mississippi— 
account for over 70% (USDA/ERS 1987-2005). Most facilities in these states are 
controlled by fewer than 50 agribusiness firms, with the top four firms producing 56% of 
all the broilers in the country (Aho 1999; Goodwin 2005; Hendrickson and Heffernan 
2005).  The horizontal integration of firms into a few massive and powerful broiler 
companies is a relatively recent phenomenon; between 1982 and 2002, the top four 
broiler firms experienced a five-fold increase in the number of broilers they produced and 
sold.  The eight-firm concentration ratio increased from 44.1% to 66.6%.  (Goodwin 
2005).  
 
These firms benefited from a massive increase in the amount of poultry consumed 
by American households, due in part to consumer concerns over the health implications 
of red meat intake.  Between 1969 and 1992, total broiler sales increased by almost 3 
billion head, or over 120% (USDA/ERS 1997).  The retail value of broilers in the United 
States topped $43 billion in 2004 (USDA/ERS 1987-2005; USDA/NASS 2002). 
 
Hidden Risks and Costs of the Integrated Model of Broiler Production 
 
  The process of vertical integration coincided with a growing prevalence of 
contract arrangements in the industry. These two phenomena played no small role in the 
production and feed-efficiency gains experienced by the industry, and in the reduction in 
production costs.  While these improvements are significant and should not be 
discounted, vertical integration and contract arrangements have also brought new risks 
and costs to industry players and consumers.  A few of the negative implications of the 




Today, the 30-year trend towards vertical integration and contract-based 
production in the poultry industry is essentially complete.  The USDA reports that 90% 
of broilers produced in the United States are now under production contracts (Hamilton 
1995). While contracts have been an essential tool to increase production and marketing 
efficiencies in the broiler sector, recently some have voiced concern that contracts have 
led farmers to exchange production and price risks for contract risks (MacDonald 2004). 
 
Hamilton (1995) outlines the uniqueness of poultry and livestock contracts, which 
raise particular legal concerns.  For example, under most broiler production contracts, the 
contractor, not the grower, owns the animals, but livestock contracts usually require 
significant investments in fixed capital assets, which are shouldered by the grower. In 




most instances, the contracting company retains some if not all control over the grower’s 
production methods, reducing the autonomy of the grower in the interest of quality 
control. Production contracts have proliferated in the market so extensively that they 
have, in many cases, priced out other options and limited growers’ production and 
marketing choices. As a result, growers may be locked into a contract relationship that 
does not serve their needs. They may be placed in a position where they have to accept 
unattractive arrangements or face going out of production (Kolmer 1963){Carstensen, 
2003 #142}.    
 
Building on these characteristics of poultry production contracts, existing research 
documents some of the specific problems. Studies show that integrators pass on 
downward price movements in livestock markets more fully to contract farmers than they 
do price increases.  For example, two studies report that declining domestic demand for 
broilers in the mid- to late-1990s led contractors to reduce their payments to farmers 
producing broilers (Lee 1996; Morison 1996).  At the same time, because income is 
usually fee-based and contractually determined, farmers have often had little opportunity 
to profit from rising market prices (Perry 1999).   
 
Other studies indicate that farmers are at risk for exploitation because they have 
unequal bargaining power with large contract firms.  With increased industry 
concentration, farmers have fewer choices over the company with whom they contract. 
Furthermore, because terms of contracts are not generally publicized, farmers may find it 
difficult to compare prices and conditions across contracts (Carstensen 2003).  A 2004 
USDA/ERS study of production contracts in the broiler industry showed a broad range 
for compensation paid to growers by contract firms. 25% of contract producers received 
fees of at least 26 cents a head, while another 25% received fees of no more than 16 cents 
a head (MacDonald 2004).  
 
Over the last decade, these concerns have increasingly found voice in the legal 
arena.  One lawsuit, which involved fraud and breach of contract by the agribusiness 
giant ConAgra, awarded compensatory damages to growers after ConAgra employees 
were found guilty of incorrectly weighing delivery trucks of broilers for slaughter and 
underpaying growers as a result (Hamilton 1995).  
 
Other Concentration Issues 
 
If large producers in concentrated markets are able to realize economies of size, 
concentration may, in some cases, lead to lower production costs, greater input demand, 
and lower consumer prices. However, concentration can also present a risk to consumers 
and growers. Economic theory suggests that the concentration of market power in a small 
number of firms could negatively affect competition and the price discovery process, 
skewing the market prices of inputs and livestock output as well as industry wage rates 
(Knoeber 1995; Carstensen 2003).  Contractual arrangements and vertical integration can 
act as a barrier to entry to smaller firms because they limit market outlets; work by 
Harper et al. (2002) suggests that this has been a particular problem for mid-sized 
livestock producers, who are unable to find processing and packing facilities that will 




                                                
accept their meat.  For independent producers who remain in business following a wave 
of concentration in their sector, trading on spot markets may become more volatile 
because prices are based on fewer trades. In addition, if quality premiums in contract 
arrangements are not made publicly available, small producers may be subject to price 
discrimination. (IATP 1999; MacDonald 2004).  
 
With respect to the consumer and society at large, research suggests that 
concentration and integration may reduce the benefits of industrialization by ultimately 
making the system less efficient, impacting prices, and/or reducing consumer choice 
(Murphy 1999; Hendrickson 2001; Heffernan 2002; Taylor 2002; Carstensen 2003; 
Vorley 2003). When only a few firms dominate the industry, they may limit the spread of 
innovation, and market preference may skew towards the firms that gain market power, 
not those that exhibit the most innovative production, marketing, or distribution 
techniques. Concerns exist, then, that a system lauded for efficiently disseminating new 
technologies may ultimately stifle innovation and technological change (IATP 1999; 
MacDonald 2004; Farm Foundation 2006). 
    
Human and Environmental Health Impacts of CAFOs 
 
While the average poultry house in the 1950s contained ten thousand birds, today 
few feed companies would sign contracts with farmers who produce less than 125,000 
birds a year. The USDA currently designates a livestock or poultry operation as a 
confined animal feeding operation (CAFO) if it houses more than 1,000 units.  1,000 
animal units translates into between 30,000 and 100,000 broilers, depending on the 
watering and waste management systems that are used inside a broiler house
2 (USDA 
2006). A large and growing literature documents the direct harm to human and 
environmental health from emissions, byproducts, toxic waste, and infectious agents that 
are produced when hundreds of thousands of birds are confined to a one-story metal 
structure that is generally hundreds of feet long and up to fifty feet wide.  Documented 
impacts include increased particulate matter air and water pollution; elevated nutrient and 
hormone levels in water sources; soil degradation due to elevated nutrient levels; and 
compromised human health due to odor (Lorig 1991; Cressie 1997; Cole 1999; NRDC 
2000; Schiffman 2000; Wing 2000; Marks 2001; ISU 2002; Oemke 2004; Easton 2005; 
Walker 2005).    
 
One study in particular, published in 2002 by Iowa State University and the 
University of Iowa Study Group, addresses the public health and environmental impacts 
of CAFOs, particularly regarding the impacts on air quality.  Among other findings, the 
report documents the respiratory diseases and dysfunction among swine and poultry 
workers from exposures to complex mixtures of particulates, gases, and vapors within 
CAFO units.  It also highlights other important considerations surrounding CAFOs 
beyond air emissions, including concerns about water quality, the health of CAFO 
 
2 Animal unit conversion is a technique used by the USDA to determine pollution equivalents across 
different types of animals; for example, one unit equals one slaughter cow or 2.5 hogs.  




workers, the socioeconomic impact on rural communities, and the emergence of 
antibiotic resistant microorganisms (ISU/UISG 2002).   
 
The findings of environmental damage from confined livestock operations, as 
well as the concerns raised by the contract system, suggest that there are hidden costs to 
industrial livestock production. Thus far, however, economic analyses have largely 
supported the industrialization of the livestock sector based on cost efficiency and 
economies of size and scale (see, for example, McBride and Key 2003). Our research 
raises doubts about the efficiency assumption by highlighting another factor in the 
economics of industrial livestock firms: below-cost pricing of the corn and soybeans used 
to make animal feed.  
 
 
IV: Methodology and Data 
 
To estimate the gains to the broiler industry from low-priced feed components, we 
build on methodologies developed by others for the purposes of estimating the “dumping 
margins” for U.S. crops exported at prices below their production costs (Berthelot 2003; 
Oxfam 2003; Ritchie 2003). For our purposes, the methodology used in this literature for 
calculating the cost of production is of particular interest.   
 
IATP’s Ritchie uses USDA estimates of the average economic costs for 
commodity producers. Total economic costs include full ownership costs for operating a 
farm business. Included in this category are all variable and fixed cash expenses except 
interest payments; capital replacement; estimated costs of land; an estimated cost of 
unpaid labor; and the cost of capital invested in production inputs and machinery. IATP 
then divides these costs by yield for each crop to calculate the total cost of production per 
bushel (Ritchie 2003). The USDA estimates land values using the cash rental rates for 
comparable acreage in the area, while the estimate of the value of the farmers’ unpaid 
labor is based on wages in the local labor market (McBride 2005). This category of costs 
will hereafter be referred to as the Farmer Cost of Production, or FCOP.  
 
The USDA FCOP estimate does not include any government payments. Because 
IATP is not trying to estimate the leakage of subsidy payments outside the farm sector, 
but instead to determine the true farmer costs of production for different crops, the only 
subsidy payment added to the FCOP is input subsidies.  The rationale is clear: Input 
subsidies are a direct cost of production covered by the government.  Input subsidy data 
comes from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
main international body charged with gathering and reporting agricultural support data 
for member countries (OECD 2005).  OECD reports annual data in its Producer Support 
Estimate (PSE) category for Payments Based on Input Use.  The category includes 
payments affecting specific variable input costs, such as the Agricultural Credit Program, 
Energy Payments, Grazing Payments, Extension Service, Emergency Conservation 
Program and Farmland Protection Program, and others (Ritchie 2003). 
 




IATP then adds the cost of transportation and handling to their full cost of 
production estimates, since the project’s goal is to determine international dumping of 
agricultural commodities, measuring the export price against the full costs of producing 
the good and bringing it to the Gulf port. Admittedly, their transportation estimates are 
simply residuals; they are calculated as the difference between the market price in 
commodity-producing states and the market price at the Gulf, and vary widely from year 
to year. IATP uses an average transport cost for each commodity for all of its 
calculations.  
 
Other analysts have elaborated on IATP’s methodology in an attempt to provide 
what they believe are more accurate estimates of the true cost of producing supported 
crops, but these methods are more problematic. Oxfam America calculates export 
dumping margins for corn by multiplying U.S. corn subsidy payments per ton, as 
reported by the Commodity Credit Corporation, by the total volume of exports to Mexico 
(Oxfam 2003). The resulting number is presented as an “implicit subsidy” to exported 
U.S. corn. This technique suggests a direct transmission of subsidy to price, and may 
overestimate the dumping margin, perhaps by a significant amount.  
 
Trade analyst Jacques Berthelot critiques both Oxfam and IATP, suggesting that a 
more realistic picture of production costs would be the farmer cost of production, as 
calculated by the USDA, plus the full amount of government subsidies paid to a 
particular crop. He notes, however, that government subsidies are intended to offset the 
costs to the farmer of land and unpaid labor. To avoid double-counting these costs—since 
they are also included in the USDA FCOP estimate—he takes out the USDA land and 
unpaid labor line items (Berthelot 2003). His methodology is problematic, however, in 
that it also assumes direct transmission of subsidy to price; a “fairer” market price would 
equal the FCOP plus subsidies. This methodology, too, may produce unrealistic estimates 
of dumping, mainly because some subsidies are politically determined supplemental 
returns to land and labor on the farm.  They do not directly reflect costs, making them 
less useful to the dumping definition.  
 
By including only explicit government subsidies to inputs, IATP has avoided 
some of the problems mentioned above. Of all subsidy categories, input subsidies are 
perhaps the most reflective of direct costs of production.  The inclusion of only input 
subsidies will likely return a conservative estimate for the total cost of producing a crop, 
since some of the government payments not included in the calculations are also likely to 
be used by farmers to offset rising production costs. 
 
One strength of the IATP methodology is that it is consistent with a World Trade 
Organization definition of dumping, a definition currently applied mainly to non-
agricultural market goods. The WTO calculates dumping as the difference between the 
“normal value” of a good—the value it would have in the exporting country market—and 
the export price of the good. It proposes several alternative techniques to calculate 
“normal value” of the good. If the good is not normally sold on the home country market, 
or if market distortions complicate pricing, the WTO allows member countries to 
estimate the price using a comparable price for a like product exported to a third country, 




or by constructing the cost of production in the country of origin based on producer and 
government records, and adding a “reasonable amount” for administrative, selling, and 
general costs (WTO 1994).  IATP’s methodology is most compatible with this final 
technique. USDA ARMS survey data, on which production cost estimates are based, are 
a reasonable proxy for producer records. Government support for inputs is included as 
well, as it offsets a direct cost to the producer.  Transportation and handling falls under 
the category of “general costs.” Together, these costs of production are compared to the 
export price for agricultural products to determine international dumping.  
 
While its compatibility with a WTO definition of dumping is a clear attribute of 
the methodology, the IATP calculations are not without limitations.  One important 
critique is put forth by IATP itself: agricultural land values in the United States are 
distorted by government policies. Several analysts explore the politically-derived nature 
of land values in the United States, bringing into question the USDA land value estimates 
included in the FCOP calculation. (Weersink 1999; Ryan 2001; Gardner 2002; Shaik 
2005) Shaik et al. (2005) demonstrate a positive correlation between crop returns and 
agricultural land values, and between farm program payments and land values. In other 
words, because several government subsidy programs are tied to base acreage, the value 
of the subsidy is capitalized into the value of agricultural land. Shaik et al. estimate that 
between 1938 and 1980, the share of agricultural land values generated by farm program 
payments was as high as 30 to 40 %; Between 1980 and 2004, the share declined to an 
average of 15 to 20 % (Shaik 2005). This latter finding supports that of Ryan et al., who 
conclude that land values were inflated by government farm payments by an average of 
19 % between 1990 and 2001 (Ryan 2001).  
 
If the costs of agricultural land are overvalued, USDA estimates of the FCOP may 
present a misleading picture of true production costs to farmers. A positive correlation 
between farm program payments and land values will tend to show a similar correlation 
between government subsidies and overall farmer production costs; conversely, reducing 
subsidies will diminish returns and drive down land values, resulting in lower farmer 
costs of production. The relationship between land values, farm income, and cost of 
production makes it difficult to judge how cost/price margin calculations can be used to 
evaluate the effects of policy change, since falling land values may reduce the FCOP 
numbers enough to show significant reductions in cost/price margins.  
 
While USDA FCOP calculations may be politically derived, at least in part, they 
do reflect actual costs of land – mortgage payments, rental payments, insurance, taxes, 
etc. – so we proceed with our analysis using this data.  Later, we perform a sensitivity 
analysis to determine the extent to which lower land-cost estimates would affect our 
findings.  We adjust the IATP methodology for use on domestic markets by eliminating 
transportation and handling costs. We then use USDA farmer cost-of-production 
estimates for corn and soybeans in the North Central region of the United States 
(USDA/ERS 1986-2005; USDA/ERS 2005), plus government input subsidies for each 
crop (OECD 2005), to create an estimate of the full cost of producing corn and  




                                                
soybeans.
3 This full COP is then compared to the price of the crop on local markets to 
find the cost-price margin.  We complete these calculations for the years 1986-2005. The 
market price estimate for 2005 is taken from the USDA’s World Agriculture Supply and 
Demand Estimates (WASDE) Report for January 12, 2006 (USDA 2006), while all other 
years are taken from the Feed Grains Database and Oil Crops Yearbooks of the 
USDA/ERS (USDA/ERS 1986-2005; USDA/ERS 2005).  
 
Using these cost-price margins, we estimate the gains that accrue to industrial 
broiler chicken producers through their ability to purchase feed corn and soybean meal on 
the market at a price below what it costs to produce them. According to industry contacts 
and the USDA/ERS, broiler feed is a mixture of about 60% corn, 25% soybean meal, and 
15% additional ingredients (generally including bone meal or protein supplements, 
vitamins, and minerals) (Harvey 2006). The soybean-to-soybean meal conversion ratio is 
1.362 : 1 (CBOT 2005).  Between 1986 and 2005, the price of a ton of soybean meal 
averaged 75% the price of the volume of soybeans needed to produce the meal (authors' 
calculations based on USDA/ERS 1986-2005). Given these parameters, we can estimate 
the share of feed prices attributable to the cost of raw corn and soybeans converted to 
soybean meal.  
 
Between 1997 and 2004, the cost of raw corn and soybeans converted to meal 
accounted for an average of 78% of the total cost of feed (authors' calculations based on 
USDA/ERS 1986-2005; USDA/ERS 1987-2005; USDA/ERS 2005). We can calculate 
the dollar value of that share per ton of feed, based on USDA/ERS data on the market 
price of broiler feed (USDA/ERS 1987-2005).
4  
 
Using our previously calculated cost-price margins, we adjust the dollar value of 
the corn and soybean meal portion of feed to determine the price that broiler producers 
would pay for a ton of feed if they paid the full cost of production for the corn and 
soybean meal components. The difference between the cost of a ton of feed at market 
price and the recalculated cost represents an estimate of the implicit subsidy to broiler 
producers from below-cost feed components.  
 
3 The use of an average cost of production for corn and soybeans is well-justified, as there is surprisingly 
little variation in production cost by farm size. For example, ERS data for cost of corn production 
disaggregated by farm size (small, medium, large, and very large) for the ERS North Central region (Iowa, 
Missouri, Illinois, and Indiana) shows that large farms had the highest production costs (10% above 
average), and very large farms had the lowest (just 5% below average). Medium-sized and small farms’ 
costs were within one percentage point of the regional average. It is therefore reasonable to use the average 
cost of production for feed components (USDA/ERS 2006). 
4 It is worth mentioning a complicating factor with respect to broiler feed market price data. Given that 
many, if not most, of the large-scale broiler companies purchase corn and soybean meal from the market 
and mill their own feed (Harvey 2006), the market price for broiler feed may not be fully representative of 
the average cost that broiler companies pay. As concentration has increased in the industry, cost data has 
increasingly become proprietary information, making price discovery difficult (MacDonald 2004; 
Cunningham 2006). To validate the accuracy of the USDA/ERS data on feed costs, we contacted a 
researcher from within the industry who shared feed cost data with us for the years 2000-2004. The 
numbers were comparable to USDA/ERS data, boosting our confidence in the USDA data set (Confidential 
Industry Contact 2006). 





In the interest of being able to examine the relationship between major policy 
changes – specifically, the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill – and these trends, and because 
of limitations on the availability of government support data from the OECD, our data 
cover the time period 1986-2005. Our analysis will focus mainly on the post-1996 Farm 
Bill period (1997-2005), which is most relevant to the current policy environment, but we 
will use the pre-1996 Farm Bill period of 1986-1996 for comparison.  
 
 
An Overview of the Data 
 
We begin with a brief overview of the data on FCOP for corn and soybeans and 
briefly discuss  production and yield trends (USDA/ERS 2005).  As noted earlier, we 
calculate the total cost of production for corn and soybeans by adding together the FCOP 
estimates from USDA, and OECD estimates of government payments based on input use. 
Both are presented on a dollar per bushel basis. FCOP includes the sum of operating and 
allocated overhead costs (referred to by the USDA as “cash and economic” costs prior to 
1995) for inputs provided by operators, landlords, and contractors (USDA/ERS 2005).  
For 1986 through 2004, FCOP estimates are based on producer surveys conducted every 
3-8 years for each commodity as part of the Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS). FCOP estimates for 2005 are from USDA’s Cost of Production Forecasts, 
which are developed as part of the USDA Baseline Projections to help estimate projected 
net returns for major field crops (USDA/ERS 2006).  We use databases from USDA’s 
Economic Research Service to obtain estimates for yield, planted acreage, and production 
(yield x planted acreage) (USDA 2006). 
 
In general, changes in the FCOP per bushel move counter to changes in total 
production of corn and soybeans: as total production increases, FCOP per bushel 
decreases.  Often this is simply a function of climate or other exogenous factors, as 
higher or lower production levels reduce or increase per-bushel costs.  Rising 
productivity, however, will also result in lower costs per bushel.   
 
The estimate for government input subsidies come from the OECD Producer 
Support Estimate (OECD 2005).  Only the category of payments based on input use is 
used, consistent with the IATP methodology described above. The specific payments 
included in the category of input subsidies are also described above. Because OECD data 




  Figure 4 presents FCOP data for corn from 1986-2005, including input subsides 
and land value component of FCOP.  Figure 5 shows an index of the changes in planted 
acres, yield, and production for the same years.  





Figure 4: Corn Cost of Production 
Cost of Production, Corn, Including Land 
















































  Figure 5: Index of Corn Acreage, Yield, and Production 
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Figure 4 depicts rising farmer costs of production per planted acre, except 
between 2000 and 2002. Figure 5 shows an upward trend in corn yield during the period 




                                                
under study. Per bushel, then, we calculate that FCOP decreased overall by 21% between 
1997 and 2004, paralleling the relative average increase in yields and planted acreage.  
Preliminary data from the USDA suggest that the FCOP/bushel rose back to 1997 levels 
in 2005, largely due to increased fuel prices.  While minor feed grain acreage has 
dropped over the last fifteen years, U.S. corn plantings and yields have increased over the 
same period because of improved varieties and government policy changes, such as those 
enacted in 1996 that eliminated all remaining planted acreage restrictions for program 
crops (Westcott 1999).  Government input subsidies, included in Figure 4, have 
fluctuated from $0.06/bu and $0.09/bu between 1996 and 2005. Land values, which make 
up an average of 22% of the FCOP, rise after 1996 and fall in 2001, 2003, and 2004, 
when market returns for corn were low.  Compared to the pre-1996 period, farmer costs 
of production per acre, including land values, are higher, while government subsidies to 
inputs are similar on average.  Planted acreage for corn has remained relatively constant 
since 1986, though with less fluctuation in the post-1996 Farm Bill period.   
 
Curiously, Figure 4 shows a decline in FCOP per acre between 2000 and 2001 
despite falling production. Following consultation with staff at the USDA/ERS, we 
determined that FCOP estimates for 2001-2004 were based on a survey conducted in 
2001, while FCOP estimates for 1997-2000 were based on survey data collected in 1996.  
In short, a break in the data collection between 2000 and 2001 accounts for the apparent 
FCOP deviation observed in the graph (Foreman 2006).
5
 
Since 1996, planted acres have remained relatively steady, but production has 
risen, dramatically in some years, as yields have increased.  Much of the fluctuation is 
accounted for by climatic change, with drought conditions in 2001-2, and strong growing 





  With the exception of 2001 to 2003, when soybean yields diminished due to 
drought and soybean aphid infestation (Ash 2006), U.S. soybean production has climbed 
steadily over the past ten years, reaching record high yields in 2004 (FAPRI 1999-2006).  
FCOP per acre increased steadily through 2001 and then again between 2002-2004, while 
FCOP per bushel fluctuated depending on yields and production levels. In the post-1996 
 
5 The drop in FCOP per acre between 2000 and 2001 raises some concerns about the USDA FCOP data 
points for the years 1997-2000 and 2002-2005, since the algorithm for calculating production costs was 
consistent for each year, using the 1996 and 2001 survey data as baselines. The drop between 2000 and 
2001 suggests that the algorithm applied to the 1996 data did not accurately predict 2001 levels. According 
to the ERS, "Estimates made in the survey year should be regarded as the most reliable because they reflect 
both prices and technologies used on the commodity. The reliability of estimates in non-survey years likely 
varies for each commodity by the degree of technical and structural change that has occurred since the last 
survey" (USDA/ERS 2005). The change would not significantly affect the results.  If we assume instead 
that the cost of corn production per acre actually declined at a steady rate from 1996 to 2001, and use these 
adjusted numbers to calculate a new cost-price margin for corn, we find the average cost-price margin for 
1997-2001 declines by about 4 percentage points, from 29% to 25%. This finding would result in a slightly 
lower, but still quite large, implicit subsidy calculation. 




Farm Bill period, per bushel FCOP ranged from a low of $5.50/bu in 2004, 
corresponding to the record high level of production, to a period high of $6.70/bu the 
year before when weather and pests impacted much of the crop.  Land values, which 
account for an average of 29% of the FCOP estimate for soybeans, rose steadily after 
1996, falling only in 2003 when market returns fell. Government input subsidies for 
soybeans varied from $0.15/bu and $0.22/bu between 1997 and 2004.  
 
  Figure 6: Soybean Cost of Production 
Cost of Production, Soybeans, Including 













































We observe the same deviation from the typical production/FCOP relationship 
that we see for corn—FCOP and soybean production levels appear to have declined 
concurrently—in this case between 2001 and 2002.  Again, after consulting with experts 
at the USDA/ERS, we learned that there was a break in data collection for these years; 
soybean farmers were surveyed in 2002 to establish a new base year for estimates, while 
the 2001 data was updated from a 1997 survey.  According to the USDA/ERS, this 
explanation accounts for most of the difference we observe in FCOP between 2001 and 
2002 (Livezey 2006).
6
                                                 
6 See footnote 4; the same issue applies to soybean COP data for 1998-2001. If we assume that cost of 
soybean production actually declined at a steady rate between 1997 and 2002, our average cost-price 
margin for soybeans for 1998-2001 would fall by 2 percentage points, from 26% to 24%. Again, this would 
result in slightly lower implicit subsidies for those years, but our finding would still be large enough to 
raise serious concern about the gains to industrialized broiler companies from policies that result in low 
feed prices.  




  Figure 7: Soybean Acreage, Yield, and Production 
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Several factors have contributed to the increased soybean production visible in 
Figure 7, including new seed varieties, improved applications of fertilizers and pesticides, 
and farm policies, particularly the 1996 FAIR Act.  Production was enhanced by 
excellent yields in 1996-1998, when an absence of freezing weather in the fall allowed 
late-planted fields to mature well into October. 1997 saw a bumper soybean harvest; 
farmers responded by planting more acres, increasing acreage by 6.3 million acres over 
the 64.2 million planted in 1996 (USDA/ERS 1986-2005; FAPRI 1999-2006). 
 
Of some debate is the impact of herbicide-tolerant genetically modified seeds.  
Analysts have struggled, often unsuccessfully, to isolate the effects of GE adoption from 
other factors in yield studies (Lin 2001).  Herbicide-tolerant soybeans were made 
commercially available in 1996, and since then have become the most widely adopted 
biotech crop in the U.S.  Today, herbicide-tolerant soybeans account for 87% of total 
U.S. soybean acreage (Fernandez-Cornejo 2006).  A study published in 2001 examining 
farm-level effects of adopting herbicide-tolerant soybeans found that adopters’ yields in 
1997 were 3% higher than for non-adaptors (Lin 2001). A more recent study, published 
in 2006, found that rapid adoption of herbicide-tolerant soybeans had little impact on net 
farm returns in 1997 and 1998 (Fernandez-Cornejo 2006).   It is difficult to draw 
conclusions about the impact of herbicide-tolerant soybeans on yields and FCOP from 
data analyzed for one or two years.  More research in this area is needed.  
 
There is little debate, however, over whether or not the 1996 policy changes have 
had a significant impact on total soybean production since then. As mentioned earlier, the 
combination of increased planting flexibility beginning in 1990, the dismantling of 
supply controls, and the introduction of decoupled payments allowed farmers to shift land 




from other crops into soybeans when market prices for soybeans were favorable.  The 
2002 Farm Act allowed farmers to establish soybean base acres for the first time, 
providing less incentive to scale back production despite low prices (Ash 2006).   
 
 
Corn and Soybean Price Trends  
 
The acreage, yield and production trends outlined above had clear price impacts 
in both corn and soybean markets. USDA market price data for the North Central region 
show a sharp drop in prices for both corn and soybeans beginning in 1996 and lasting 
through 2001, due in part to the Asian financial crisis and in part to changes in production 
and yield.  Soybean market prices fell from $6.91/bu in 1996 to $4.16/bu in 2001 
(USDA/ERS 1986-2005; USDA/ERS 2005).   By 1999, corn prices had plummeted to 
lows not seen since the mid-1980s, dropping from $2.79/bu in 1996 to $1.67/bu in 1999 
(USDA/ERS 2005). A 2002-2003 drought squeezed corn supplies and brought prices up 
to $2.30/bu; many farmers moved out of soybeans and into corn in seek of higher returns, 
and record production brought corn prices back down to $2.10/bu in 2003. In contrast, 
soybean production fell, and market prices rebounded for the first time in six years, to 
$5.19/bu. By 2004, however, farmers chasing high returns had moved back into 
soybeans. Helped by record high yields from good weather, 2004 soybean production 
levels surged to a new high, dropping the market price to $5.58/bu.  Overall market 
returns to soybean farmers fell, as the price drop more than offset the increase in yield. 
Strong domestic and international demand for corn in 2004, due in part to a decline in 
exports from China and the increased demand for corn-based ethanol in the United States, 
kept corn prices steady despite record levels of production.   
 
Preliminary USDA estimates for 2005 soybean market prices show a continued 
drop, to $5.45/bu., as production continues at a high level (USDA 2006).  Initial price 
estimates for corn show a decline as well, to around $1.90/bu (USDA 2006).   
 
The price, acreage, and production trends illustrate an imperfection in agricultural 
markets that was exacerbated by the policy changes enacted in 1996.  Rather than cutting 
back on planted acreage or production when prices are low, production generally moves 
in an opposite direction from market prices, increasing when prices drop. While farmers 
do generally adjust their planting decisions based on which crop will bring in the highest 
anticipated returns, the majority simply cycle between corn, soybeans, and hay—or just 







  Taking the difference between the true cost of production and the market price as 
a percentage, we find the percent below cost of production at which corn and soybeans 




are sold, otherwise known as the cost-price margin. Data and calculations are available in 
Appendix A.  
 
  Figure 8: Corn Cost-Price Margins 










































  Figure 9: Soybean Cost-Price Margins 











































                                                
As Figure 8 shows, the market price was consistently below the true production 
cost of corn in almost every year from 1986-2005.  In the eleven-year period before the 
1996 policy reform, the average cost-price margin was 17%.  After the reforms, cost-
price margins widened to an average of 23% between 1997 and 2005.   
 
For soybeans, Figure 9 shows lower cost-price margins than for corn, with prices 
above costs in three of the twenty years studied.  Between 1986 and 1996, margins 
averaged 5%.  After the 1996 reforms, margins tripled to an average of 15%.  
 
Thus, our first finding is that prices have indeed been below true costs of 
production for both corn and soybeans since 1986.  Moreover, we can confirm that 
margins for both commodities were significantly higher following the 1996 policy 
reforms.
7   
 
 
Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry 
 
Based on our cost-price margin findings, we can estimate the discount that 
industrial broiler producers receive when farm policies allow the prices of feed corn and 
soybeans to fall below their costs of production, so that industrial operations can purchase 
feed more cheaply than family farmers can produce it. Data and calculations are available 
in Appendix B. We refer to this discount as an “implicit subsidy”—not a direct subsidy 
from the government to industrial broiler producers, but a discount on operating costs that 
industrial producers receive from the price effects of federal farm policy. Stated 
differently, the implicit subsidy measures how much industrial broiler companies gain 
from purchasing feed under current policy conditions, compared with what they would 
pay for feed if federal farm policies were structured to ensure that feed prices reflected 
the cost of producing the feed components.  
 
Figure 10 illustrates the implicit subsidy from below-cost feed between 1986 and 
2005. We see a low implicit subsidy when corn and soybean prices rose, in 1996 and then 
again in 2002-2004 because of supply shocks from drought and other factors. From 1986 
to 1996, the implicit subsidy to corporate broiler producers averaged $377 million per 
year, with feed prices an average of 10% below what they would have been if the corn 
and soybean meal components had been priced at full costs of production.  Following the 
1996 reforms, the implicit subsidy rose to $1.25 billion per year on average, an increase 





7 T-tests comparing cost-price margin data pre- and post-Farm Bill (1986-1996 and 1997-2005) confirmed 
a statistically significant difference between the two periods for the soybean margins (t-stat = -2.06, p<.05) 
but not for corn (t-stat = -1.11, p = .1). The legitimacy of any t-test in this case is questionable given the 
small sample size.  
8 A t-test comparing the feed price reduction percentages before and after the policy change (1986-1996 
and 1997-2005) confirmed a significant difference (t-stat = -2.21, p<.05). The legitimacy of any t-test in 
this case is questionable given the small sample size.  




The overall impact on broiler production costs from low-priced feed has been 
significant.  Since feed costs average 60% of total production costs, between 1986 and 
1996, broiler production costs were 6% lower than they would have been if industrial 
broiler companies were paying full cost of production for feed. Between 1997 and 2005, 
the implicit subsidy kept broiler production costs 13% lower.
9  
 
  Figure 10: Implicit Subsidy to Broiler Industry 















































The Winners and Losers from U.S. Farm Policy 
 
Our findings are clear.  Below-cost feed has been a boon to the broiler industry, 
and the policy reforms in 1996 have significantly increased the implicit subsidy to the 
industry.  The implicit subsidy in the post-Farm Bill period was over $850 million higher 
per year on average than in the pre-Farm Bill period. Consistent with previous findings 
on the impacts of agricultural policy change on commodity prices (Scott 1999; Ray 2003; 
Zulauf 2003), we conclude that the industrialized broiler industry is a major beneficiary 
of U.S. agriculture policies that have allowed the price of feed grains and soybeans to fall 
below, sometimes far below, production costs.
10   
                                                 
9 USDA data on the cost of broiler production per pound is only available for the years 1998-2002, so the 
five-year average of $0.25/lb is used for all other years analyzed 
10 Even the literature concluding that U.S. policy had a significant impact on commodity prices after 1996 
acknowledge a number of other factors at play, including the Asian financial crisis, which reduced global 
demand, and yield increases from technological innovation and good weather.  However, other forces at 
work during the same period had an upward effect on prices, including the 2002-2003 drought.  On 
average, our findings show a relationship between policy change and commodity price volatility. The 




                                                                                                                                                
These findings have implications, of course, for more than just broiler producers.  
Other industrial livestock operations that rely on processed feed made from corn and 
soybeans have also received implicit subsidies.  Data on hog production suggests that 
industrial hog operations (defined by the USDA/ERS as housing over 5,000 head) spend 
54-65% of production costs on feed (Tarter 2001; McBride and Key 2003) using a 
mixture that averages 80% corn and 17% soybean meal (VES 2000).  Assuming that feed 
accounts for 60% of production costs for industrial hog operations, preliminary 
calculations suggest that a scenario in which industrial hog producers had to pay full cost 
of production for the corn and soybean meal used in hog feed would have increased 
industrial hog operators’ total production costs by an average of 13% from 1997-2005.  
The implicit subsidy (again, a term we use to describe the discount to industrial firms 
from farm policies that allow feed market prices to fall below feed production costs) to 
industrial firms with over 5,000 hogs, which have captured a growing share of the pork 
market since 1997, grew from $81 million in 1997 to nearly $1 billion in 2005, with 
variation in the interim. The average implicit subsidy to industrial hog companies in the 
post-1996 Farm Bill period was $566.3 million per year.
11 It should be noted that an 
industrial hog operation is not the same as a hog CAFO (Confined Animal Feeding 
Operation); CAFOs are defined as operations housing over 1,000 animal units (equivalent 
to 2,500 hogs weighing over 55 lbs), and the category therefore includes many operations 
with fewer than 5,000 head of hogs (Environmental Protection Agency 2002).  The 
implicit subsidy to hog CAFOs would thus be assumed to be larger, perhaps much larger, 
than the implicit subsidy to industrial operations. 
 
Full-cost pricing of feed could have an important impact on an industry in which 
consolidation is well underway but is not yet complete.  If industrial operations are 
getting a 13% discount on their operating costs due to U.S. agricultural policies that 
depress feed prices below production costs, they are enjoying a cost advantage over 
diversified hog farmers who grow crops and raise livestock in free-range environments.  
That is a very significant cost advantage, one that could well be providing the 
competitive edge that allows CAFO-based hog production to out-compete diversified 
farmers.  If that is the case, then a policy change that resulted in the market price of feed 
 
findings are bolstered by statistical analyses in the literature mentioned above. For example, Zulauf  
(Zulauf 2003) notes in the Review of Agricultural Economics:  “Following enactment of the 1996 Farm 
Bill, corn and soybean implied volatilities covering the pre-harvest and storage seasons increased 16-23% 
between 1987-1995 and 1997-2001. The increase was statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.” 
11 Authors’ calculation based on a comparison of the market price for corn and soybeans (USDA/ERS 
1986-2005; USDA/ERS 2005) to the estimated full cost of producing the commodities. Assumes that feed 
accounts for 60 % of industrial hog producers’ production costs (Tarter 2001; McBride and Key 2003) and 
that the price of a ton of soybean meal is 75% the price of the volume of soybeans needed to produce it 
(USDA/ERS 1986-2005). A 1998 estimate of production costs for industrial hog producers of $0.44/lb 
(McBride and Key 2003) is used for all years 1997-2005. Total hog production for 1997-2005 from 
(USDA/ERS 2005). The percentage of national hog inventory on industrial-sized operations, defined as 
those housing over 5,000 hogs (USDA/NASS 2005), is used as a proxy for share of the pork market held by 
industrial firms.  The inventory proxy likely underestimates the share due to inequities in market access 
between smaller and larger hog operations, and the enhanced distributional capacity of industrial, vertically 
integrated operations.   




better reflecting the cost of producing the feed components could reduce the advantage 
that industrial operations currently receive over diversified, independent producers.  
 
This is an important area for further research.  The poultry industry is fully 
consolidated, but the hog and cattle industries are still in the midst of a process of vertical 
integration and concentration.  If U.S. agricultural policies are feeding the 
industrialization of our livestock industries, policymakers and the public should be aware 
of it and recognize that corporate livestock firms are some of the real beneficiaries of 
policies that keep commodities prices low. 
 
Losing Out: Taxpayers and Family Farmers 
 
Taxpayers are one group that loses out in the current policy environment. Because 
subsidy levels rise when prices fall, the years when financial windfalls to the broiler 
industry from low-priced feed were the greatest were also the years when total 
government payments to farmers were at all-time highs.  Overall, the cost of U.S. farm 
programs has doubled since the 1996 reforms.  Total government subsidies to corn 
production rose from $2.5 billion in 1997 to $10 billion in 2000, and have averaged 
around $5 billion a year since then. Total soybean subsidies rose from $4 million in 1997 
to almost $3 billion in 2000, and have averaged $2 billion a year since (USDA/FSA 
2001; USDA/FSA 2004). Our research shows that these increased taxpayer expenditures, 
which have replaced higher market prices as a source of income support for farmers, 
benefit the purchasers of low-priced commodities, such as industrial livestock operations. 
A system in which farmers are not compensated for their production by market prices but 
instead by taxpayer subsidies shifts the burden of supporting farmers from agribusiness 
purchasers to taxpayers. The burden also shifts to the many farm families who must work 
off-farm jobs to stay in business when subsidies do not fully make up for low prices.   
 
Our research does not address the question of how much farmers benefit from the 
full array of government subsidies discussed above. Rather, we consider only the 
relatively minor category of government subsidies for inputs as part of the total cost of 
production for corn and soybeans. We then compare those costs to market prices, and 
suggest that the difference is a loss to farmers: for each year since 1997, farmers have 
been compensated by the market at a level below what farmers and the government pay 
to produce the crops. Some readers will undoubtedly speculate that the massive subsidies 
noted above would offset the market loss, bringing farmers to profitability; indeed, U.S. 
farm policy debates often depict farmers as living well off the government dole. In 
reality, however, research suggests that farmers are another group losing out under 
current U.S. farm policy, despite the massive subsidy outlays. 
 
Farm income data from the USDA/ERS suggests that subsidies often fail to bring 
farmers to profitability. When prices plummeted after the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill, 
government farm payments tripled; but despite the influx of taxpayer dollars, net farm 
income fell over the same period by an inflation-adjusted average of 15.5% (Ray 2003; 
USDA/ERS 2005; Wise 2005).  Calculations by agricultural economists at the University 
of Tennessee suggest that even when subsidies are added to market income, returns for 




most program crops are well below USDA estimates of the total economic cost of 
production (Ray 2003).  The majority of farm families have had to support their 
households with off-farm employment because farm income, payments included, cannot 
support them (Jones 2006).  Subsidies attempt, but often fail, to make up for low prices.  
 
While family farmers selling corn and soybeans on the market suffer from 
policies that depress the market prices of these crops, farm households growing grain and 
oilseed crops to feed their own livestock lose out for reasons touched on above. 
Diversified family farms pay full operating and ownership costs to produce the grains and 
oilseeds that they use as feed, although they may receive input subsidies from the 
government to offset a small portion of the direct cost of production. Taking corn as an 
example, between 1997 and 2005, government input subsidies offset approximately 2% 
of total corn production costs (authors' calculations based on OECD 2005; USDA/ERS 
2005).  Meanwhile, over the same period, industrial operations have been able to 
purchase corn from the market at an average of 23% below what the farmer and 
government pay to produce it. Confined feeding operations purchasing all of their feed 
from the market are thus at a cost advantage when compared to diversified operations that 
grow feed grains and oilseeds themselves, even those that receive government input 
subsidies.  
 
  This study also leaves to other researchers the task of determining the impact on 
consumers of a policy change that would increase the market prices of raw commodities, 
moving them more in line with production costs. The degree of consumer impact would 
depend on a variety factors. Research could examine the price response of a processed 
product, such as meat, to an increase in the cost of the raw commodity inputs; the extent 
to which agribusiness purchasers and processors pass on input price increases to 
consumers of value-added products, or use the input price increase to justify an increase 
in processed food prices; or possibilities for complementary policies that could support 




As mentioned earlier, research suggests that the farmer cost of production 
estimates provided by the USDA are complicated by the inclusion of estimates for the 
value of agricultural land (Weersink 1999; Ryan 2001; Gardner 2002; Shaik 2005). 
While land values represent real costs to farmers—payments on mortgages, rental fees, 
taxes, insurance—they are inflated by government payments because payments raise 
returns, and land values are determined in part by expected future earnings from farming 
(Ryan 2001; Harl 2003).  Land value estimates make up a significant percentage of 
USDA cost of production estimates—an average of 22% for corn and 29% for soybeans 
between 1986 and 2005—so the overvaluation of land could present a misleading picture 
of true production costs, making our cost-price margin findings less reliable.   
 
We test this theory by reducing the costs of land in the previous calculations.  
Based on the conclusion of Shaik et al. (2005) that the inflation of land values generated 
by farm program payments between 1980 and 2004 was between 15% and 20%, and the 




finding of Ryan et al. (2001) that payments inflated land values by 19% on average after 
1990 (Ryan 2001; Shaik 2005), we deflate the land value estimate in the USDA cost of 
production data by 20%.  
 
Deflating land values by 20% brings the cost/price margin for corn down by an 
average of four percentage points between 1997 and 2005, from 23% to 19%.  For 
soybeans, the margin shrinks by about six percentage points, from 15% to 9%. Broiler 
industry gains are reduced by an average of $333 million annually, or 26%, with the 
adjusted production cost estimates, to slightly less than $1 billion per year.  Data and 
calculations for cost-price margins and the implicit feed subsidy using the adjusted FCOP 
are available in Appendices C and D.   
 
Adjusting for the possible overvaluation of land in the FCOP, cost-price margins 
for corn and soybeans are smaller, but they are still large, as is the implicit subsidy to the 
broiler industry from below-cost feed, which averages almost $1 billion per year.  The 
policy implications of this finding are important, since they suggest that even if land 
values were deflated by ending government farm subsidies, farmer production costs 
would still exceed market prices for corn and soy for most years, except those in which 
supply was particularly constrained. Price modeling by Ray, de la Torre Ugarte, et al. 
(2003) found that eliminating marketing loan, counter-cyclical, and direct government 
payments to farmers would decrease net farm income by 25-30%, but that prices for corn 
and soy would continue to decline slightly each year as farmers increased production to 
capture every available farm dollar (Ray 2003). 
 
Looking Towards the Future 
 
How well do our findings hold as a guide to the future?  The policy environment 
leading up to the legislation of a new farm bill in 2007 is much the same as the latter 
period studied here.  Still, averages can often be deceiving; within our findings, there is 
significant variation. Is our average a good indication of what we might expect in the 
future? The answer to this question hinges on market price trends for corn and soybeans 
and on trends in production costs for farmers.  
 
Future production costs and planted acreage for corn and soybeans, and their 
future cost-price margins, will be determined in large part by new trends in alternative 
energy.  Data from the USDA/ERS and FAPRI predict that higher prices for fuel, 
fertilizer, and other inputs will increase farmers’ cost of production; at the same time, 
however, the development of alternative crop-based energy regimes could have 
significant impacts on total corn and soybean production levels. Both sources predict that 
corn will play a leading role in the new alternative energy movement, limiting the 
expansion of soybean production. According to a recent study by the USDA, if the 
current trends and new Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) provision of the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 continue, the share of ethanol in total corn disappearance will nearly double 
in the next ten years, from 12% in 2004/2005 to 23% in 2014/2015 (Baker 2006).  In its 
Agricultural Outlook for 2006, FAPRI predicts that as early as 2007/2008, the use of corn 
to produce ethanol will exceed U.S. corn exports (FAPRI 1999-2006).   




There is no better cure for chronic low prices caused by overproduction than new 
demand for agricultural products that comes from outside the food industry.  The rising 
demand for bio-based fuels could offer an important respite from below-cost prices, 
particularly for corn.   
 
Because of domestic ethanol production, USDA and FAPRI predict that corn 
prices will increase over time.  The annual capacity of the U.S. ethanol sector stood at 4.4 
billion gallons in February 2006, and is expected to reach 7 billion gallons by 2010 
(Baker 2006).  This trend is not expected to have a significant impact on corn prices until 
2009/2010, however, and as our figures demonstrate below, a positive cost-price margin 
is expected to continue through that time.  It stands to mention, however, that the 
projected price increase could change under a couple of scenarios.  An unanticipated 
increase in demand for grain-fed livestock in China and elsewhere in the developing 
world could raise prices more than estimated here. However, prices could be lower than 
estimated if the United States changed its policy on the importation of Brazilian ethanol, 
or put significant investment in ethanol production from cellulosic biomass products such 
as switchgrass or mill residues. Market prices for corn could also decline if corn 
production in South America and China increased global supply. If fertilizer and fuel 
costs continue to rise, corn—an energy-intensive crop—could begin to look much less 
attractive as an alternative energy source.  
 
Finally, prices could decline if significant acreage were taken out of the 
Conservation Reserve Program and put back into corn or soybean production. Modeling 
by the University of Tennessee provides a window into this scenario: the authors estimate 
that if CRP were eliminated entirely, 37% of currently fallowed land would come back 
into agricultural production. Corn prices in 2015 would be $0.31/bu below USDA 
estimates, or $2.29 a bushel. This price is higher than the $1.90/bu farmers received in 
2005, but lower than the ten-year high of $2.79/bu they saw in 1996. The model shows 
2015 soybean prices $0.90/bu lower than USDA estimates, at $5.20 a bushel. This is 
significantly lower than the already low $5.45/bu farmers received in 2005 (de la Torre 
Ugarte 2006). If this scenario plays out even in part, FAPRI estimates of significant 
increases in corn and soybean prices will prove unrealistic, and our cost-price margins 
will widen. 
 
Increased ethanol production could impact feed prices for industrial broiler 
companies in at least two ways. First, a rapid rise in ethanol production could raise corn 
market prices, in turn encouraging producers to shift from planting soybeans to corn and 
reducing soybean planted acreage. Such a change may result in higher market prices for 
broiler and other livestock feed. However, for hogs and cattle, and to a limited extent for 
broilers, the feed price increase may be tempered by a second trend. The production of 
distillers’ dried grains with solubles (DDGS), a co-product of ethanol production and a 
mid-protein feed, is expected to increase, and will likely displace some of the corn and 
soybean meal used in animal feed, reducing demand for these commodities. DDGS is 
already substituting for a portion of soybean meal and corn in cattle feed, and is making 
its way into hog and poultry rations (Baker 2006).   
 




Though demand for soybean oil, the other major co-product of soybean crushing, 
may grow, the long term prediction is that soybean expansion for domestic non-food use 
will be limited because of competition from corn, while soybean expansion for the export 
market will be limited because of competition with South America (Ash 2006).  While 
one might expect higher soybean prices to result from the reduction of planted acreage, 
FAPRI price projections suggest that if current commodity policies are maintained over 
time, the average market price for soybeans is still expected to remain at an average of 
9% below the cost of production through 2011 (FAPRI 1999-2006).  Soybean meal is 
generally the greatest expense in a ton of feed, so as long as it continues to make up a 
portion of feed for broilers, the broiler industry will continue to reap gains from the 
projected scenario.  
 
To estimate the future costs of producing corn and soybean meal, as well as their 
market price, and potential gains to the broiler industry for 2005 through 2011, we relied 
on data from the FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2006 (FAPRI 1999-2006).  This data 
source provided us with projections for planted area, yield, production, and market price 
for corn and soybeans, as well as projected production of broilers.  We assume that the 
FCOP per planted acre for corn will remain relatively steady, and thus used a 1997-2004 
average of $356.43 per acre for the future FCOP. This assumption may return a 
conservative cost-price margin estimate because FCOP per acre generally increases over 
time, as shown earlier in Figures 4 and 6. We estimate government input subsidies for 
corn to be $0.07 per bushel, the average for the 1997-2004 period. This assumption 
appears sound, given that input subsidies averaged around $0.07/bu over the 19-year 
period 1986-2005. Under the same assumptions, we calculate the FCOP for soybeans to 
be $247.75 per acre and input subsidies to be $0.17 per bushel, both averages from 1997-
2004. It should be noted that our calculations do not account for any changes to the feed 
mixture that could take place if DDGS use increases across the livestock industry. Data 
and calculations are available in Appendix D.  
 
Figure 11 illustrates the projected trend for the total cost of producing corn and 
the cost-price margin from 2006 to 2011.  Based on projections of increased ethanol 
production from U.S. corn over the next ten years, we can conclude that the negative 
margin starting in 2010 accounts for higher corn prices due to increased domestic 
demand.  However, the average margin over the period is still positive, at 4%.  
 
As Figure 11 illustrates, cost-price margins are large for soybeans through 2007, 
likely due to surplus supplies in the U.S. and South America. Under the assumption that 
U.S. ethanol production from corn continues to grow, we conclude that the shrinking 
cost-price margins for soybeans between 2008 and 2011 is at least partially attributable to 
the conversion of land from soybeans to corn, but is offset somewhat by global supply 
increases from South America.  The average margin is positive throughout the period, at 
12%. 




  Figure 11: Projections of Future Cost-Price Margins for Corn and Soybeans 
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When we substitute the true cost of producing corn and soybean meal into the 
feed cost calculations, we find that feed costs would increase by 7% on average between 
2006 and 2011 if the market price reflected the true cost of production.  Total broiler 
production costs would increase by an average of 4%. Assuming, then, that future 
agriculture policies continue to allow feed market prices to fall below production costs, 
total gains to the broiler industry from low-cost feed will average $419 million dollars a 
year, significantly smaller than the average of $1.25 billion that we found for the 1997-
2005 period, but still larger than the 1986-96 average of $377 million.  Data for the future 
projections can be found in Appendix E.  
 
As mentioned above, industry gains will be reduced by narrowing cost-price 
margins, which are caused by rising corn prices due to ethanol production and declining 
planted acreage in soybeans. Again, however, the gains could be much larger than in our 
projected scenario if U.S. ethanol import policies change, if land currently enrolled in the 
Conservation Reserve Program is put back into agricultural production, if fuel and 
fertilizer costs continue to rise, or if more intensive production in Brazil, Argentina, and 
China causes world grain and oilseed supplies to increase.  
 
A related topic, but one we will only mention in passing here, is the role of U.S. 
subsidies to the ethanol industry in further shaping the U.S. livestock production system. 
On the one hand, increased use of corn for ethanol may put pressure on feed corn 
supplies, driving up prices. On the other hand, because ethanol production creates the co-
product DDGS, which can be used as a high-protein animal feed component, livestock 
operations able to purchase DDGS may benefit to a significant degree from U.S. policies 
that encourage and subsidize ethanol production.   






We have demonstrated that below-cost corn and soybeans have been a boon to the 
corporate broiler industry and that the financial benefits of U.S. policies that encourage 
high levels of production and low prices have increased with the 1996 policy reforms.  
Those benefits are not small, averaging $1.25 billion per year in the post-1996 period.  
Though rising demand for corn-based ethanol may push corn prices up and narrow cost-
price margins in coming years, there is no indication that feed prices will naturally 
approach their true costs of production. 
 
It is outside the scope of this project to discuss the various policy proposals that 
could secure farmer and rancher livelihoods and reduce the burden on taxpayers from 
U.S. farm payments. Such policies would in any case better balance supply and demand 
so prices could rise to above production costs.  It stands to mention that policy changes 
that raise the market prices of corn and soybeans would negatively affect not just the 
agribusiness corporations who use U.S. farm products as a major input, but also small 
and mid-sized farmers and ranchers who purchase corn and soybeans from the market. 
However, those farm and ranch households selling corn and soybeans, or diversified 
farmers and ranchers who feed their own grains or soybeans to livestock, would benefit 
from such policy changes.  
 
It is incumbent upon agricultural economists to analyze current U.S. farm policies 
in such a way as to paint an accurate picture of their structural and economic impacts. 
Such an analysis is especially important for those sub-sectors of the livestock industry, 
such as beef cattle and hogs, that are moving toward but have not yet reached full 
integration and industrialization. This study helps lay the groundwork for such research.  
Other analytical techniques may ultimately prove more accurate.  Regardless, it is clear 
that the development of sensible proposals for farm policy reform hinges on a thorough 
understanding of the impacts of these policies, and on recognizing the true winners and 
losers under the current system.   
 
As policymakers turn their attention to the 2007 Farm Bill, they would do well to 
examine the ways in which agribusiness firms in general, and industrial livestock 
operations in particular, benefit from policies ostensibly designed to support family 
farmers.  As this study suggests, most diversified independent family farmers would be 
better served by policies that ensure market prices in excess of production costs.  To the 
extent such policies reduce the current cost advantages enjoyed by industrial animal 
factories, they will further the stated goals of U.S. agricultural policy, and will perhaps 
help reverse the trend toward concentrated industrial hog and beef cattle production. 
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Table 1: Cost-Price Margin, Corn, 1986-1996 
      1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
FCOP  (1)                          $/Bu 2.05 2.06 3.16 2.48 2.49 2.65 2.26 2.90 2.25 2.88 2.70 2.53 
Input Subsidies (2)  $/Bu  0.07  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.08 
Full  Cost  (3)  $/Bu                          2.12 2.14 3.26 2.57 2.57 2.74 2.33 2.98 2.31 2.97 2.77 2.61
Avg Mkt  Price (4)  $/Bu  1.36  1.53  2.56  2.18  2.16  2.29  2.01  2.26  2.02  2.74  2.79  2.17 




Table 2: Cost-Price Margin, Corn, 1997-2005 
    1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Average 
FCOP (1)  $/Bu  2.77  2.64  2.68  2.72  2.39  2.46  2.35  2.20  2.74  2.55 
Input Subsidies (2)  $/Bu  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.07 
Full Cost (3)  $/Bu  2.84  2.70  2.74  2.78  2.46  2.54  2.43  2.26  2.81  2.62 
Avg Mkt  Price (4)  $/Bu  2.50  1.91  1.67  2.00  1.80  2.30  2.10  2.10  1.90  2.00 
Cost/Price Margin (5)  %  12%  29%  39%                37% 27% 9% 13% 7% 32% 23%
 
 
(1) The Farmer Cost of Production as reported by the USDA. Source: ERS Historic and Recent cost and returns, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/testpick.htm 
(2) Includes only those government subsidies to corn categorized by the OECD as based on input use. Source: OECD, Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_33773_32264698_119656_1_1_1,00.html 
(3) FCOP plus input subsidies.  
(4) Market Year Average Price for the USDA North Central Region.  Source: USDA/ERS Feed Grains Database, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/feedgrains/ 












                     
Table 3: Cost-Price Margin, Soybeans, 1986-1996 
      1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
FCOP  (1)                          $/Bu 4.89 5.00 6.94 6.05 5.76 5.87 5.51 6.71 5.29 6.30 6.30 5.87 
Input Subsidies (2)  $/Bu  0.22  0.24  0.29  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.17  0.20  0.16  0.20  0.22  0.21 
Full  Cost  (3)  $/Bu                          5.11 5.23 7.23 6.27 5.96 6.07 5.69 6.91 5.45 6.49 6.52 6.08
Avg Mkt Price (4)  $/Bu  4.52  5.00  7.54  5.52  5.87  5.50  5.24  6.09  5.34  6.25  6.91  5.80 





Table 4: Cost-Price Margin, Soybeans, 1997-2005 
      1997 1998                  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
FCOP  (1)                        $/Bu 5.72 5.76 6.23 6.20 6.14 5.80 6.70 5.50 6.54 6.06 
Input Subsidies (2)  $/Bu  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.19  0.23  0.16  0.17  0.17 
Full  Cost  (3)  $/Bu                      5.89 5.91 6.38 6.35 6.28 5.99 6.93 5.66 6.71 6.23
Avg Mkt Price (4)  $/Bu  6.49  5.16  4.43  4.44  4.16  5.19  6.57  5.58  5.45  5.27 
Cost/Price Margin (5)  %  -10%  13%  31%  30%  34%  13%  5%  1%  19%  15% 
 
 
(1) The Farmer Cost of Production as reported by the USDA. Source: ERS Historic and Recent cost and returns, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/testpick.htm 
(2) Includes only those government subsidies to corn categorized by the OECD as based on input use. Source: OECD, Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_33773_32264698_119656_1_1_1,00.html 
(3) FCOP plus input subsidies.  
(4) Market Year Average Price from the USDA North Central Region. Source: USDA/ERS Oil Crops Yearbook, 1987-2005, http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-
sets/crops/89002/ 
(5) Calculated as (Full cost – market price) / market price.  
 
 
Table 5: T-Tests: Cost-Price Margins for Corn and Soybeans Over Two Periods (1986-1996 and 1997-2005) 
  1986-1996 1997-2005   
         
           
           
Mean SD Mean SD  t p  value
Corn  0.17 0.09 0.22 0.12 -1.11 0.13









                   
Appendix B: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry 
 
Table 6: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry, 1986-1996 
         1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Feed avg. mkt. price (1)  $/ton  187.30  143.10  148.40  103.20  131.00  126.70  125.40  131.40  136.50  138.50  174.40   
Corn/soy price portion (2)  $/ton  74.54  83.06  131.22  103.29  106.10  104.70  96.65  110.53  97.82  123.37  130.74   
Corn & soy full price (3)  $/ton  98.10  99.64  144.79  119.43  116.67  121.58  108.27  135.14  105.84  131.17  126.70   
Change in feed cost (4)  %  13%  12%  9%  16%  8%  13%  9%  19%  6%  6%  -2%  10% 
Change in total prod. cost (5)  %  8%  7%  5%  9%  5%  8%  6%  11%  4%  3%  -1%  6% 
Industry underpays (6)  $/lb.  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  -0.003   
Broiler Production (7)  Millions of lbs.  19,661  21,523                     22,465 23,979 25,631 27,203 28,829 30,618 32,529 34,222 36,479
Implicit industry subsidy   Millions  US$                          $371 $374 $308 $562 $310 $512 $401 $860 $287 $289 -$127 $377
 
Table 7: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry, 1997-2005 
         1997 1998 1999                2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
Feed avg. mkt. price (1)  $/ton  157.80  128.60  103.10  104.70  101.30  113.50  132.10  157.20  122.90   
Corn/soy price portion (2)  $/ton  119.9  93.53  81.02  83.00  81.55  103.03  111.25  101.96  96.02   
Corn & soy full price (3)  $/ton  122.37  119.26  124.46  125.29  116.99  116.17  122.36  106.57  129.22   
Change in feed cost (4)  %  2%  20%  42%  40%  35%  12%  8%  3%  27%  21% 
Change in total prod. cost (5)  %  1%  12%  25%  24%  21%  7%  5%  2%  16%  13% 
Industry underpays (6)  $/lb.  0.002  0.03  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.004  0.04   
Broiler Production (7)  Millions of lbs.  37,541                   38,554 40,829 40,829 41,626 41,452 43,958 35,200 34,915
Implicit industry subsidy   Millions US$                      $86 $1,110 $2,477 $2,463 $2,184 $778 $555 $155 $1,415 $1,247
(1) Broiler feed market price data from USDA/ERS Poultry Yearbook, 1987-2005, http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/livestock/89007/. 
(2) The portion of the price of a ton of feed that is attributable to corn and soybean meal, based on the market prices of corn and soybeans. Assumes that the soybean-to-soybean meal conversion ratio is 1.362 : 1 
(Chicago Board of Trade 2005), and that 1 ton of broiler feed = 0.6 ton corn, 0.25 ton soybean meal, and 0.15 ton other (USDA/ERS, 2006). We assume that the price of a ton of soybean meal is 75% the price of the 
volume of soybeans needed to produce it, based on a cost comparison of 1.362 short tons of soybeans to 1 short ton of soybean meal (USDA/ERS 1986-2005).   
(3) The portion of the price of a ton of feed that is attributable to corn and soybean meal, if the crops were priced at their full cost of production (FCOP + input subsidy). The same assumptions hold as above (2).  
(4) Calculated as: (Full cost of the corn and soybean portion of feed – the market price of corn and soybean portion) / Market price of corn and soybean portion.  
(5) Assumes that feed costs = 60% of broiler production costs (USDA/ERS, 2002). 
(6) Given the cost-price margin of the corn and soybean portion of broiler feed, this represents the dollar amount per pound that the industry underpays for feed. The ERS only provides data on the cost of production 
per pound for broilers for the years 1998-2002. Therefore, the 1998-2002 average of $0.25/lb has been used for all other years. Source: USDA/ERS Poultry Yearbook, 1987-2005 




   
       
           
Table 8: T-Test: % Change in Feed Costs from Paying Full COP for Feed Components Over Two Periods (1986-1996 and 1997-2005) 
  Mean  SD  t   p value 
1986-1996  0.09 0.06
1997-2005  0.2 0.16 -2.21* 0.02
 
 
Appendix C: Cost-Price Margins, Adjusted Methodology to Account for Overvaluation of Land 
 
Table 9: Cost-Price Margin, Corn, Adjusted for the Overvaluation of Land (1986-1996) 
                1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Original FCOP (1)  $/Bu  2.05  2.06  3.16  2.48  2.49  2.65  2.26  2.90  2.25  2.88  2.70  2.53 
USDA Land est. (2)  $/Bu  0.35  0.37  0.63  0.50  0.51  0.56  0.48  0.55  0.46  0.58  0.62  0.51 
Adjusted FCOP (3)  $/Bu  1.98  1.98  3.03  2.38  2.39  2.54  2.16  2.78  2.15  2.76  2.57  2.43 
Input Subsidies (4)  $/Bu  0.07  0.08  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.08 
Full  Cost  (5)  $/Bu                          2.05 2.06 3.13 2.47 2.47 2.62 2.23 2.87 2.22 2.86 2.65 2.51
Avg Mkt Price (6)  $/Bu  1.36  1.53  2.56  2.18  2.16  2.29  2.01  2.26  2.02  2.74  2.79  2.17 
Cost/Price Margin (7)  %  34%  26%  18%  12%                  13% 13% 10% 21% 9% 4% -5% 14%
 
 
Table 10: Cost-Price Margin, Corn, Adjusted for the Overvaluation of Land (1997-2005) 
      1997  1998  1999  2000 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Average 
Original FCOP (1)  $/Bu  2.77  2.64  2.68  2.72  2.39  2.46  2.35  2.20  2.74  2.55 
USDA Land est. (2)  $/Bu  0.65  0.63  0.64  0.65  0.60  0.65  0.60  0.55  0.65  0.62 
Adjusted FCOP (3)  $/Bu  2.64  2.52  2.55  2.59  2.27  2.33  2.23  2.09  2.61  2.42 
Input Subsidies (4)  $/Bu  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.07 
Full Cost (5)  $/Bu  2.71  2.58  2.61  2.65  2.34  2.41  2.31  2.15  2.68  2.49 
Avg Mkt Price (6)  $/Bu  2.50  1.91  1.67  2.00  1.80  2.30  2.10  2.10  1.90  2.00 
Cost/Price Margin (7)  %  8%  26%  36%  34%  23%  5%  9%  3%  29%  19% 
 
(1) The Farmer Cost of Production as reported by the USDA. Source: ERS Historic and Recent cost and returns, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/testpick.htm 
(2) USDA estimate for the value of land.  
(3) Original FCOP is adjusted to account for the overvaluation of land by deflating the land value estimate by 20%.  
(4) Includes only those government subsidies to corn categorized by the OECD as based on input use. Source: OECD, Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_33773_32264698_119656_1_1_1,00.html 
(5) Adjusted FCOP plus input subsidies.  
(6) Market Year Average Price for the USDA North Central Region.  Source: USDA/ERS Feed Grains Database, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/feedgrains/ 
(7) Calculated as (Full cost – market price) / market price.  









Table 11: Cost-Price Margin, Soybeans, Adjusted for the Overvaluation of Land (1986-1996) 
                1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Original FCOP (1)  $/Bu  4.89  5.00  6.94  6.05  5.76  5.87  5.51  6.71  5.29  6.30  6.30  5.87 
USDA Land est.  (2)  $/Bu  1.32  1.35  1.95  1.47  1.51  1.41  1.38  1.69  1.36  1.58  1.77  1.53 
Adjusted FCOP (3)  $/Bu  4.63  4.73  6.55  5.76  5.45  5.59  5.24  6.37  5.02  5.98  5.95  5.57 
Input Subsidies (4)  $/Bu  0.22  0.24  0.29  0.21  0.20  0.20  0.17  0.20  0.16  0.20  0.22  0.21 
Full  Cost  (5)  $/Bu                          4.85 4.96 6.84 5.97 5.66 5.79 5.41 6.57 5.18 6.17 6.17 5.78
Avg Mkt Price (6)  $/Bu  4.52  5.00  7.54  5.52  5.87  5.50  5.24  6.09  5.34  6.25  6.91  5.80 




Table 12: Cost-Price Margin, Soybeans, Adjusted for the Overvaluation of Land (1997-2005) 
    1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Average 
Original FCOP (1)  $/Bu  5.72  5.76  6.23  6.20  6.14  5.80  6.70  5.50  6.54  6.06 
USDA Land est.  (2)  $/Bu  1.78  1.81  1.99  1.95  1.91  2.02  2.28  1.86  2.15  1.97 
Adjusted FCOP (3)  $/Bu  5.36  5.40  5.83  5.81  5.76  5.40  6.17  5.16  6.11  5.66 
Input Subsidies (4)  $/Bu  0.18  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.19  0.23  0.16  0.17  0.17 
Full Cost (5)  $/Bu  5.54  5.55  5.98  5.96  5.91  5.58  6.40  5.32  6.28  5.83 
Avg Mkt Price (6)  $/Bu  6.49  5.16  4.43  4.44  4.16  5.19  6.57  5.58  5.45  5.27 
Cost/Price Margin (7)  %  -17%  7%  26%                26% 30% 7% -3% -5% 13% 9%
 
 
(1) The Farmer Cost of Production as reported by the USDA. Source: ERS Historic and Recent cost and returns, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/costsandreturns/testpick.htm 
(2) USDA estimate for the value of land.  
(3) Original FCOP is adjusted to account for the overvaluation of land by deflating the land value estimate by 20%.  
(4) Includes only those government subsidies to corn categorized by the OECD as based on input use. Source: OECD, Producer and Consumer Support Estimates, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_33773_32264698_119656_1_1_1,00.html 
(5) Adjusted FCOP plus input subsidies.  
(6) Market Year Average Price for the USDA North Central Region.  Source: USDA/ERS Oil Crops Yearbook, 1987-2005, http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-
sets/crops/89002/ 








           
Appendix D: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry, Adjusted for the Overvaluation of Land 
 
Table 13: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry, Adjusted for the Overvaluation of Land (1986-1996) 
                  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average
Feed avg mkt price (1)  $/ton  187.30  143.10  148.40  103.20  131.00  126.70  125.40  131.40  136.50  138.50  174.40   
Corn/soy price portion (2)  $/ton  74.54  83.06  131.22  103.29  106.10  105.70  96.65  110.53  97.82  123.37  130.74   
Corn/soy true price (3)  $/ton  93.97  95.35  138.13  114.29  111.44  116.29  103.42  129.34  101.09  125.45  120.42   
Change in feed cost (4)  %  10%  9%  5%  11%  4%  8%  5%  14%  2%  2%  -6%  6% 
Change in tot. prod. cost (5)  %  6%  5%  3%  6%  2%  5%  3%  9%  1%  1%  -4%  4% 
Industry underpays (6)  $/lb.  0.016  0.013  0.007  0.016  0.006  0.013  0.008  0.021  0.004  0.002  -0.009   
Broiler Production (7)  Millions of lbs.  19,661  21,523                     22,465 23,979 25,631 27,203 28,829 30,618 32,529 34,222 36,471
Implicit industry subsidy  Millions of  US$                          $306 $277 $157 $384 $157 $341 $233 $657 $117 $77 -$324 $217
 
Table 14: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry, Adjusted for the Overvaluation of Land (1997-2005) 
     1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Average 
Feed avg mkt price (1)  $/ton  157.80  128.60  103.10  104.70  101.30  113.50  132.10  157.20  122.90   
Corn/soy price portion (2)  $/ton  119.95  93.53  81.02  83.00  81.55  103.03  111.25  101.96  96.02   
Corn/soy true price (3)  $/ton  115.94  112.87  117.68  118.56  110.63  109.30  114.55  100.80  122.12   
Change in feed cost (4)   %  -3%  15%  36%  34%  29%  6%  2%  -1%  21%  15% 
Change in tot. prod. cost (5)  %  -2%  9%  21%  20%  17%  3%  1%  0%  13%  9% 
Industry underpays (6)  $/lb.  -0.004  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.004  -0.001  0.03   
Broiler Production (7)  Millions of lbs.  37,540.8  38,553.6                 40,829.8 40,829 41,626.1 41,452.4 43,958 35,200 34,915
Implicit industry subsidy  Millions of US$                      -$143 $835 $2,090 $2,071 $1,782 $371 $165 -$39 $1,112 $917
 
(1) Broiler feed market price data from USDA/ERS Poultry Yearbook, 1987-2005, http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/livestock/89007/ 
(2) The portion of the price of a ton of feed that is attributable to corn and soybean meal, based on the market prices of corn and soybeans. Assumes that the soybean-to-soybean meal conversion ratio is 1.362 : 1 
(Chicago Board of Trade 2005), and that 1 ton of broiler feed = 0.6 ton corn, 0.25 ton soybean meal, and 0.15 ton other (USDA/ERS, 2006). We assume that the price of a ton of soybean meal is 75% the price of the 
volume of soybeans needed to produce it, based on a cost comparison of 1.362 short tons of soybeans to 1 short ton of soybean meal (USDA/ERS 1986-2005).   
(3) The portion of the price of a ton of feed that is attributable to corn and soybean meal, if the crops were priced at their full cost of production (FCOP + input subsidy). The same assumptions hold as above (2).  
(4) Calculated as: (Full cost of the corn and soybean portion of feed – the market price of corn and soybean portion) / Market price of corn and soybean portion.  
(5) Assumes that feed costs = 60% of broiler production costs (USDA/ERS, 2002). 
(6) Given the cost-price margin of the corn and soybean portion of broiler feed, this represents the dollar amount per pound that the industry underpays for feed. The ERS only provides data on the cost of production 
per pound for broilers for the years 1998-2002. Therefore, the 1998-2002 average of $0.25/lb has been used for all other years. Source: USDA/ERS Poultry Yearbook, 1987-2005 
(7) Source: USDA/ERS Poultry Yearbook, 1987-2005 GDAE Working Paper No. 06-03: “Feeding the Factory Farm: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Chicken Industry from 





Appendix E: Future Scenarios 
 
Table 15: Corn Cost-Price Margins, 2006-2011 
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  Average 
FCOP  (1)  $/Bu  2.42 2.39 2.36 2.33 2.30 2.27  2.35 
Input Subsidies (2)  $/Bu  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
Full Cost (3)  $/Bu  2.49  2.46  2.43  2.40  2.37  2.34  2.42 
Mkt Year Average Price (4)  $/Bu  2.08  2.20  2.30  2.38  2.44  2.46  2.31 
Cost-Price Margin (5)  %  16%  11%  5%  1%  -3%  -5%  4% 
 
(1)  Farmer Cost of Production. Planted acreage and yield projections from FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2006. We assume FCOP/acre = $356.43 
(97-04 average). This likely yields conservative results, as FCOP/acre historically rises over time.  
(2)  We assume input subsidies = $0.07/bu (97-04 average). 
(3)  FCOP + input subsidies. 
(4)  Source: FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2006. 
(5)  Calculated as (Full cost – market price) / Market price.  
 
Table 16: Soybean Cost-Price Margins, 2006-2011 
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  Average 
FCOP (1)  $/Bu  6.10  6.04  5.98  5.94  5.88  5.83  5.96 
Input Subsidies (2)  $/Bu  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
Full Cost (3)  $/Bu  6.27  6.21  6.15  6.11  6.05  6.00  6.13 
Mkt Year Average Price (4)  $/Bu  4.96  5.25  5.45  5.48  5.52  5.57  5.37 
Cost-Price Margin (5)  %  21%  15%  11%  10%  9%  7%  12% 
 
(1)  Farmer Cost of Production. Planted acreage and yield projections from FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2006. We assume FCOP/acre = $247.75 
(97-04 average). This likely yields conservative results, as FCOP/acre historically rises over time.  
(2)  We assume input subsidies = $0.17/bu (97-04 average).  
(3)  FCOP + input subsidies.  
(4)  Source: FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2006.  
(5)  Calculated as (Full cost – market price ) / Market price.  
 
Table 17: Implicit Subsidies to the Broiler Industry, 2006-2011 
    2006 2007 2008  2009  2010  2011  Average 
Constructed feed mkt price (1)  $/ton  122.66  129.78  135.21  138.00  140.30  141.50   
Corn/soy price portion (2)  $/ton  95.67  101.23  105.47  107.64  109.43  110.37   
Corn/soy true price  $/ton  117.66  116.38  115.12  114.06  112.86  111.68   
Change in feed cost   %  18%  12%  7%  5%  2%  1%  7% 
Change in tot. prod. cost (3)  %  11%  7%  4%  3%  1%  1%  4% 
Industry underpays (4)  $/lb.  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.004  0.001   
Broiler Production (5)  Millions of lbs. 36,098  37,194  38,320 39,330 40,207 41,002  
Implicit industry subsidy  Millions of US$  $971  $651  $410  $275  $147  $56  $418 
 
(1) Broiler feed market price constructed on the assumption that the corn and soybean meal portions of feed account for 78% of the cost of feed (1986-
2005 average, using calculated prices for the corn and soybean meal portions of feed, compared to the broiler feed market price). Therefore, feed price = 
1.22 * the corn/soy portion of the feed.  We assume that 1 ton feed= .6 ton corn, .25 ton soy meal, .15 ton other (USDA/ERS 2006); that the soybean-to-
soybean meal conversion ratio is 1.362 : 1 (CBOT 2005); and that the price of a ton of soybean meal is 75% the price of the volume of soybeans needed to 
produce it (authors’ calculations based on meal and bean price data from USDA/ERS 1986-2005).  
(2) Soy and corn market price projections from FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2006. 
(3) We assume that feed costs = 60% of broiler production costs (USDA/ERS 2002). 
(4) Cost of broiler production assumed to be $0.25/lb (1998-2002 average). USDA/ERS Poultry Yearbooks, 1998-2002.  
(5) Broiler production projections from FAPRI Agricultural Outlook 2006.  
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